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ABSTRACT

This Article addresses the need for a more comprehensive
regulatory scheme of Australia's nonprofit organizations,
By
particularly its private foundation type structures.
considering the strengths, and more importantly, the
weaknesses of the U.S. tax regime of private foundations,
Australia can avoid pitfalls that accompany the development of
Australia's laws and regulations. The Article begins by
exploring the history, nature, and culture of Australia's
nonprofit sector. After outlining the structure of the sector, the
Article focuses on the potential for abuses if prescribedprivate
funds are not given appropriateattention to avoid such abuses.
Then, the Author details the U.S. nonprofit sector. by looking
briefly at the history and development of U.S. private
foundations, as well as actual and perceived improprieties
perpetrated throughout the regime by private individuals,
nonprofit organizations, and Congress. Finally, the Article
applies lessons learned from the U.S. regime to Australia. The
Article concludes by discussing the need for effective regulation
Such strategy,
strategy for Australia's nonprofit sector.
according to the Author, is essential to protect the tax base and
to guard against major improprietiesand scandals.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A successful innovation is usually the outcome of an evolutionary
process that depends on ideas that in large part result from collected
and evolved knowledge. During the development of the innovation,
missteps may be taken and intermittent failures may occur. Viewing
new legislation and regulations as innovations, their final governance
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successes depend initially on the breadth and depth of the knowledge
base brought to their drafting. Ultimately, politics, economics, and
enforcement capabilities play a role in their effectiveness and
successes. If one focuses on the knowledge base that drafters of
legislation and regulations can bring to the table, that knowledge
base can be enhanced by an understanding of the strengths and
weaknesses of relevant statutes and regulations of other countries.
The most effective knowledge base understands those strengths and
shortcomings in the contexts of the development and the application
of the pertinent comparative laws and regulations, the financial and
political environments in which the regulatory regime was developed
and operates, and the similarities and differences inherent in the
cultures of the countries.
The time is ripe for consideration of a more comprehensive
regulatory regime of Australia's nonprofit organizations, and
particularly of its private foundation-type structures. For the most
part, Australia's nonprofit sector currently enjoys the positive and
important societal "halo" perception that its charitable organizations
are "providers of good," "trustworthy institutions," "altruistic,
compassionate, or caring in nature," "benevolent," and "beyond
reproach."1 This perception helps to engender viable and thriving
institutions. Retention of the halo should be a priority of nonprofit
organizations and the sector. The halo effect plays an important role
in fundraising strategy, as its existence and the concepts on which it
is based stimulate donors to financially contribute to nonprofit
The halo effect also increases the demand of
organizations. 2
beneficiaries for nonprofit institutions perceived as able to provide
4
3
trusted services. As one Australian scholar has stated:
The importance of the halo can be appreciated by the consequences of
its destruction. Loss of trust means that the ability of the nonprofit
entity to attract donors is vastly reduced and may even result in the
death of the entity. Examples abound of such charities whose
trustworthiness has been questioned resulting in dire financial
5
consequences.

1.
The "halo" perception is a visual depiction of the saintly aura by which
society has viewed many charitable organizations. Scholars have written about the
"halo" effect for years. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations,31
B.C. L. REV. 501, 605-06 (1990); Henry Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation
Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 580-81 (1981).
2.
Atkinson, supra note 1, at 606.
3.
Hansmann, supra note 1, at 580-82.
Nonprofit Corporations-Reflections on
Myles
McGregor-Lowndes,
4.
Australia's Largest Nonprofit Insolvency, 5 AUSTL. J. CORP. L., Dec. 1995, reproduced
in 1995 AJCL LEXIS 38, *35-36 [hereinafter "Nonprofit Corporations-Reflections"].
5.
Id. For example in the United States, the United Way scandal involving its
chief executive officer who diverted for his own use money intended for the charity and
filed fraudulent tax returns, created years of reduced donations for the organization
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Protecting the halo becomes more difficult as Australia's
nonprofit sector and its philanthropic vehicles expand in numbers
and dimension. Opportunities increase for wrongdoing to occur, such
as tax abuse or fiduciary breaches.
As nonprofit organizations'
decision-makers are well aware, negative publicity of one or more
improprieties may taint or even destroy the halo perception enjoyed
by the individual nonprofit institutions, or indeed more globally, by
the nonprofit sector. To reduce the possibility of a blemished image,
decision-makers within the nonprofit sector and the Australian Tax
Office (A.T.O.), as well as legislators, should have an effective
knowledge base permitting reassessment and perhaps reformation of
Australia's tax regulatory regime for the nonprofit sector.
Australia's nonprofit sector dates back to the beginning of the
country's colonial settlement, 6 and its tax regulation of the sector
dates back to the late-1800s. 7 Nonetheless, its nonprofit sector, its
nonprofit institutions, and its tax regulatory regime currently appear
to be developmentally in infancy stages. For example, perhaps

and created a credibility crisis for the nonprofit sector. See Kristin A. Goss, A Crisis of
Credibility for America's Non-profits, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, June 15, 1993, at 1;
Holly Hall, United Way Donations Up 5.1%, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 26, 1999, at

25. See also Neil Steinberg, United Way Chief Quits Among Scandal, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Feb. 28, 1992, at 6 (discussing the United Way scandal and Aramony's resignation);
Andrew J. Glass, Aramony Let Down the Needy, ATLANTA CONST., Mar. 7, 1992, at Al
(questioning Aramony's tenure of power); William Aramony, "Voices:" Would You Give
to United Way? Or Are There Better Ways to Give?, USA TODAY, Apr. 5, 1995, at 8A;
Elizabeth Greene & Grant Williams, Asleep on the Watch?: A Spate of Charity Scandals
Raises Questions About the Effectiveness of Government Watchdog Agencies, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY, July 27, 1995, at 1 (discussing the "Ponzi"-type scheme of the
Foundation for New Era Philanthropy debacle, the NAACP abuses, and the United

Way scandal); W.A. Baker, The Wider Implications of Covenant House's Troubles,
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Apr. 17, 1990, at 30 (discussing a scandal involving Covenant
House with officials accused of sexual and financial impropriety); Janet L. Fix,
Wallace-Reader's Digest Funds and N.Y. Attorney General Reach Settlement, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY, May 17, 2001, at 13 (discussing settlement and its potential effect on

Wallace Funds).
In Australia, several nonprofit organizations recently have suffered notoriety for
alleged wrongdoings, including Care Australia, Youth Motor Sport Foundation, Wesley
Mission, and Brisbane's Royal. See Margaret Gibelman & Sheldon R. Gelman, Very

Public Scandals: Nongovernmental Organizations in Trouble, 12 VOLUNTAS: INT'L J.
VOLUNTARY & NONPROFIT ORG. 49 (2001) (analyzing from a cross-national perspective
publicized incidents of wrongdoing by nongovernmental organizations and their board
members).

6.

See Mark Lyons et al., Australia, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: DIMENSIONS

OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 203 (Lester M. Salomon et al. eds., 1999); see also infra

notes 23-25 and accompanying text (discussing regulations and their potential
shortcomings) [hereinafter Australia, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY].
7.
The first Act to impose a tax on income--dividends-was Tasmania's Real
and Personal Estate Duty Act 1880. See Myles McGregor-Lowndes, Does Charity Begin

and End at Home for Tax Exemptions?, at 1 (paper on file with author); see also infra
notes 54-55 and accompanying text (explaining that the first comprehensive state
income tax legislation dates from 1884).
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because the formation of private foundations in Australia has not
been tax driven until relatively recently, the number of such
institutions is limited. Although Australia provided a tax incentive to
support the creation of nonprofit institutions, through state gift and
inheritance tax relief for charitable giving, the gift and inheritance
tax provisions were abolished in the 1980s. It was not until 1999 that
the Australian federal government enacted tax deductions and tax
exemptions as incentives that would directly encourage the8 creation
of nonprofit institutions similar to U.S. private foundations.
Prior to July 1, 1999, the Australian structure sanctioned by its
federal tax statutes closest to-but not the same as-the U.S. private
foundation was the "ancillary fund." Australia's ancillary fund is a
public fund9 that must operate on a nonprofit basis and must seek
Although names of Australian nonprofit organizations may include the
8.
term "foundation," the term does not connote or represent the equivalent of a U.S.
private foundation. Effective July 1, 1999, the federal Australian government
permitted individuals and businesses to create prescribed private funds, which are.
similar to U.S. private foundations. Income Tax Assessment Act of 1997 (ITAA of
1997), § 995-1 (Austl.). See infra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
Nonetheless, the Australian Tax Office (A.T.O.) has taken the position that unless
there are special circumstances, a fund should annually distribute at least a
substantial part of its income, generally considered to be at least seventy-five percent.
ITAA of 1997, Division 30, Subdivision 30-A, § 30-15, Item 2; ITAA of 1997, Division
50, Subdividion 50-A, § 50-5, Item 1.5; A.T.O. Tax Ruling 95/27; A.T.O. IT 340. See
also infra note 9 (setting forth the A.T.O. ruling in which it defines "public fund").
A.T.O. Taxation Ruling 95/27 delineates the attributes of a public fund. In
9.
relevant part it provides:
5. The word 'public' as applied to a 'fund' refers to the source, constitution
and management of the fund rather than to the objects for which it is
established.
6. The term 'public fund' ... establishes that a fund will be 'public' where:
(a) it is the intention of the promoters or founders that the public will
contribute to the fund; (b) the public, or a significant part of it, does in fact
contribute to the fund; and (c) the public participates in the administration of
the fund.
7. There are two types of funds which are considered to be 'public funds': (a)
funds established and controlled by governmental or quasi-governmental
authority; and (b) funds to which the public is invited to contribute and in fact
does contribute. These funds must be controlled or administered by persons or
institutions having a degree of responsibility to the community as a whole.
9. For the ATO to accept a fund as a public fund, the founding documents of
the public fund must reflect the following: (a) the objects of the fund must be
clearly set out and reflect the purpose of the fund; (b) gifts to the fund must be
kept separate from any other funds of the sponsoring organization (if there is
one). A separate bank account and clear accounting procedures are required;
(c) receipts must be issued in the name of the fund; (d) the public must be
invited to contribute to the fund; (e) the fund must operate on a non-profit
basis. Moneys must not be distributed to members of the managing committee
or trustees of the fund except as reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses
incurred on behalf of the fund or proper remuneration for administrative
services; (f) the fund must be managed by members of a Committee, a majority
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public donations. It must be established under a will or trust deed
solely for the purpose of providing grants to establish or benefit other
deductible gift recipients.
It must be controlled by persons
accountable to the community and not associated with the founder of
the ancillary fund. An ancillary fund is a type of investment vehicle
that can invest its funds only as permitted under Australian law, but
cannot carry on any other activities. The ancillary fund is not
statutorily required to disburse a set percentage of income each year.
As of July 1, 1999, individuals, families, and corporations can
give an income tax deductible gift of assets to a "prescribed private
fund" without seeking broad public financial support. 10 Otherwise,
the requirements applicable to public funds must be satisfied." As
with public funds, founding documents must provide that the
controlling body of the fund must have at least one "responsible
person," a person who has general responsibility to the community
and not associated with the fund's settlor or donor in any capacity

of whom have a degree of responsibility to the general community (this
requirement does not apply to funds established and controlled by
governmental or quasi-governmental authority); and (g) should the fund be
wound-up, any surplus money or other assets must be transferred to some
other fund qualifying under subsection 78(4) or 78(5).
Objects of the Fund
10. A fund, authority or institution seeking approval of its public fund under
one of the items listed in the tables in subsection 78(4) must ensure that its
objects conform with the requirements of that particular item.
Location of fund
14. In all cases the public fund itself must be established and operated in
Australia ....

While the moneys in these funds may be used overseas, the

actual public fund must be in Australia.
For a public fund to be a deductible gift recipient, it must conform with the
requirements applicable to that tax category. See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying
text.
10.
In accordance with ITAA § 995(1), a "prescribed private fund" requires the
following in addition to those items discussed in the text accompanying footnotes 10-24:
1.

2.

8.
9.

Government endorsement if exemption from federal income taxation is
desired as an income tax exempt charity. If exemption from federal
income taxation is not sought, but deductions for donations to prescribed
private funds is desired, government endorsement is unnecessary. See
ITAA, Division 50-B, item 1.5B of §§ 50-5, 50-52, 50-60.
Establishment and maintenance of the fund under a will or trust
instrument solely for required purpose of funding philanthropic
endeavors.
Although the original donation can be retained indefinitely, limits apply
to subsequent donations, gifts, government grants and accumulation of
money within the trust fund.
An annual information tax return must be filed with the ATO.

See also A.T.O. Guidelines for Prescribed Private Funds (describing guidelines and
prescribed private funds).
11.
Id. § 995-1 (1),
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other than professional. 12 The documents must prohibit direct or
indirect benefit to the settlor or donor or any associate of that
person.' 3 A trust fund to retain the assets of the prescribed private
fund must be established, and a nondistribution constraint is imposed
on the trust fund. 14 In other words, there is an absolute prohibition
against any part of the trust fund being paid, transferred, or
distributed, by bonus, fee, or otherwise, to the trustee, any member,
director, or person who would be considered a related party to a
transaction. The prescribed private fund is not required to distribute
a particular percentage of its assets annually to further its taxexempt public purpose.
15
The U.S. nonprofit sector, which dates back to the early 1700s,
is composed of many types of nonprofit institutions. The largest
group is its § 501(c)(3) organizations, which consist of both public
charities and private foundations. A private foundation, as defined in
Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 509, is not financially supported by
a broad public-as is a public charity-but rather is supported by
16
For
one-individual, family, or corporation-or few sources.
donations to be tax deductible to a private foundation and for the
private foundation to be tax-exempt from federal income taxes, it
must comply with the statutory requirements of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). It
must be organized and operated exclusively for "religious, charitable,
scientific ... or educational purposes .... ,,17 No part of its earnings
Substantial
can inure to the benefit of a private individual. 18
lobbying activities and campaign activities to support or oppose a
candidate for public office are prohibited.' 9 A private foundation also
20
must comport with the judicially developed public policy doctrine.
Additionally, special rules attempt to ensure that a private
foundation's. funds are utilized for charitable-type public purposes
rather than merely retained by the foundation. Those rules require a
private foundation to distribute annually for its tax-exempt purposes

Id.
12.
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
15.
As early as 1713, almshouses provided shelter to ill poor persons,
foundlings, the mentally unbalanced, the physically handicapped, and even criminals.
Nina J. Crimm, Evolutionary Forces: Changes in For-Profit and Not-For-ProfitHealth
CareDelivery Structures;A Regeneration of Tax Exemption Standards, 37 B.C. L. REV.
In the 1700s, hospitals enjoyed the first tax concessions.
1, 9 n.21 (1995).
Pennsylvania Hospital, established in 1751 to care for the mentally and physically ill,
was the first hospital in America. Id. at 6 n.17. New York Hospital followed. Id.
16.
I.R.C. § 509 provides several financial formulas to determine whether the
organization is publicly supported or privately supported.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
17.
18.
Id.
19.
Id. See also I.R.C. § 4945 (which imposes an excise tax on private
foundations that expend funds on political activities).
20.
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983).
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at least five percent of the fair market value of its assets-as reduced
by debt used to acquire its assets. 2 1 U.S. private foundations'
funding, governance, and management are intimate and private,
often controlled by their founders. Nonetheless, the foundations must
pursue public benefits. 22 The Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) is
responsible for monitoring all tax-exempt organizations, 23 including
private foundations, to assure they continue to deserve the tax
privileges of exemption from income taxation and of recipients of
deductible charitable contributions.
For many years, U.S. private foundations were largely selfregulating. Over time, in an effort to curb the perceived and actual
abuses permitted by an under-regulated environment, 24 Congress
created a federal tax regulatory regime applicable specifically to
private foundations. 25 The process was arduous, time-consuming,
and often contentious. The process was riddled with various types of
problems, some of which might have been more manageable or more
easily solved with a broader and deeper understanding of private
foundations, and, if available, an appreciation of other countries'
experiences and the effectiveness of their regulatory regimes.
This Article is the product of research undertaken during an
ATAX Research Fellowship at the University of New South Wales in
2001. The views and opinions stated herein are the Author's, but
they are based on legal research and conversations with numerous
professors at several universities, employees of the Australian Tax
Office, and decision-makers of nonprofit organizations.
The thesis of this Article is that key individuals involved in and
responsible for the development of Australia's nonprofit sector, its
nonprofit entities-particularly prescribed private funds which are

I.R.C. § 4942(e).
21.
22.
Private foundations qualify for tax-exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
They are funded to some extent through tax-deductible contributions of monies that
likely otherwise would have ended up in government treasuries. Pursuant to I.R.C. §
501(c)(3) and similar state tax provisions, this diversion of assets to private
foundations requires their use for charitable, educational, scientific or similarly
legitimate purposes for public benefit considered deserving of special tax treatment.
The term "public" implies that the benefit cannot be "private" in the senses of the
foundation being established for the private advantage of a class of individuals who do
not constitute the "public" and of being not conducted for "private" profit. As one
author has concisely stated, a private foundation "is a privately organized public
institution." See JOHN W. NASON, FOUNDATION TRUSTEESHIP: SERVICE IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 4 (1989) (quoting MILTON KATZ, THE MODERN FOUNDATION: ITS DUAL
CHARACTER, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE (1968)).

23.
I.R.C. § 501(a).
24.
See infra notes 178-248 and accompanying text.
25.
The development of the federal tax regulatory scheme is discussed infra
notes 194-257 and accompanying text. The major legislation directed specifically at
private foundations began with the Revenue Act of 1950 and proceeded with the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, adding §§ 508(e), 509(a), and 4940-4946 to the
I.R.C.
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similar to U.S. private foundations-and the innovation of its
regulatory federal tax regime should heed U.S. experiences. While
Australia's nonprofit sector operates in an environment that is quite
different from the nonprofit environment in the United States,
Australia's culture, politics, and economic sectors are evolving and
are taking on characteristics also found in the United States, such as
a broadening of the wealthy class and the ability of corporations to
develop private foundation-type philanthropic vehicles. Moreover,
Australia's legislators are adopting some U.S. inspired tax measures
to boost charitable giving, including tax laws that encourage
philanthropy, that permit averaging of tax deductions, and that allow
exemptions from capital gains. The insights offered in this Article to
the U.S. federal tax regulatory scheme, if considered, might help to
thwart pitfalls that accompany the development of Australia's laws
and regulations. An appreciation of the troubles faced by U.S. private
foundations and of the shortcomings of the relevant U.S. federal tax
regulatory regime may enable key persons responsible in Australia
for the formation, operation, and regulation of prescribed private
funds to be effective in avoiding potential problems. This Article may
provide nonprofit sector leaders with an awareness of possible
negative consequences of perceived abuses of tax incentives and tax
induced arrangements.
This Article will begin in Part II with a brief exploration of the
nature and culture of Australia's nonprofit sector. Based on cases
and media coverage of Australia's nonprofit sector, the Article will
explore why prescribed private funds, without appropriate attention,
might face perceived or actual abuses similar to those faced by U.S.
private foundations.
Part III will provide a glimpse at the U.S. nonprofit sector, a
snapshot into the state and federal regulatory regimes over nonprofit
organizations, and a short history of the development of U.S. private
foundations. It will indicate some perceived and actual improprieties
perpetrated by private foundation decision-makers, as well as briefly
sketch the congressional response. Finally, the shortcomings of the
tax regulatory regime created to respond to abuses will be discussed.
Part IV will offer some insights as to why effective regulation
strategy is essential. To provide some insights for Australia's key
decision-makers in the nonprofit sector, the A.T.O., and the
legislative branch of government, comments will be made on facets of
a regulatory strategy essential to protect the tax base and to guard
against major improprieties and scandals.
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II. THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE
A. Background-Australia'sNonprofit Sector Today
Australia began as a European settlement in 1788 in Port
Jackson-now part of Sydney-and served as a penal colony. 26 The
state assumed responsibility for the inhabitants' food, clothing, and
shelter until self-sufficiency could be achieved. 27 The government
and community attended to communities' social infrastructure and
welfare needs.2 8 From the mid-1800s to the beginning of World War
I, Australia sustained a growth in both nonprofit organizations
partnering with and funded by the states and federal governments to
deliver needed services, and in those independent from the
Numerous factors, including a benign legal
governments. 29
environment, a population with a relatively high level of disposable
income, a sufficient population size to sustain voluntary
organizations, population mobility, needs that a nonprofit sector
could meet without competition, a heterogeneous population having
diverse religious beliefs and secular ideologies, economic selfinterests, a supportive social environment, and government
encouragement and finance enabled and enhanced the increase in the
nonprofit organizations. 30 After World War I, although nonprofit
organizations were closely bound to Australia's state and federal
governments as a result of their receipt of governmental funding,
an increasing number of
there appeared to be some trend toward
3
independent nonprofit organizations. '
Through the 1900s, Australia's nonprofit sector evolved to serve
new areas of activity, such as battered women refuges, and to look for
more financial resources from government, and more recently, from
corporations. 32 As part of its evolving regulatory regime applicable to

Myles McGregor-Lowndes, Australia, in PHILANTHROPY AND LAW IN ASIA 49
26.
(Thomas Silk, ed., 1999) [hereinafter Australia, in PHILANTHROPY]; MARK LYONS,
THIRD SECTOR: THE CONTRIBUTION OF NONPROFIT AND COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE IN

AUSTRALIA 99 (2001) [hereinafter THIRD SECTOR].
Philanthropy in Australia, at www.philanthropy.org.au/history.htm.
27.
Myles McGregor-Lowndes, Australia, in STUDIES ON INTERNATIONAL
28.
FISCAL LAW, TAXATION OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, 233-34 (1999)

[hereinafter

Australia, in STUDIES].
Id; Mark Lyons, Government and the Nonprofit Sector in Australia, in THE
29.
NONPROFIT SECTOR IN THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY: VOICES FROM MANY NATIONS 254, 266

(1992) [hereinafter Government and the Nonprofit Sector, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR].
LYONS, THIRD SECTOR, supra note 26, at 105-10.
30.
Lyons, Government and the Nonprofit Sector, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR,
31.
supranote 29, at 266-69.
32.

GINO DAL PONT, CHARITY LAW IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 55 (2000).
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nonprofit organizations, the government adopted laws to control
charitable collections and fundraising,3 3 as well as non-tax statutes
requiring charities to register with the Charity Commission, which
would be responsible for modernizing charities and for making them
more responsive to needs. 34 The increased legislation along with
other governmental actions, for-profit competition, and changes in the
popular appeal of nonprofit organizations, however, potentially
served to slow and curtail the tremendous growth that the nonprofit
35
sector had sustained in earlier years.
By the early 1990s, more than one-half of all welfare services in
Australia were provided by nonprofit organizations. 36 The fields of
greatest activity by the nonprofit sector had expanded since the
beginning of the century when healthcare was a major activity of
By the mid-1990s,
nonprofit hospitals and friendly societies. 37
human services, such as education, health, and social services,
dominated the activities of nonprofit organizations, although culture,
38
recreation, and housing were significant fields.
By 1995, Australia's nonprofit sector received the bulk of its
revenue from fees and charges (62.5%). 39 The fields dominated by
fees were culture and recreation (91.5%), professional (90.5%), civic
and advocacy (65.7%), development 'and housing (57.9%), health
(52%), and environment (45.2%).4 0 Although from 1976 to 1987 direct
governmental support of nonprofit organizations doubled in real
terms, 41 in 1995 the government provided only 31.1% of all revenues
The governmental sector financing has
of the nonprofit sector.
supported a substantial portion of Australia's education, social
42
services, and research.
By contrast, in 1995 there was considerably less private
philanthropic support (6.4%) of nonprofit organizations. 43 A.T.O.
statistics indicate that in 1995-1996, individuals claimed AU$528 in
an average of
deductible gifts to nonprofit organizations,
Subsequently, a study
approximately AU$165 per taxpayer. 44
concluded that in 1997, eighty-eight percent of all Australians

33.
Id. at 55-56 (briefly describing such laws as the War Charities Acts of 1916
and 1940, and the National Assistance Act of 1948).
Id. at 56.
34.
35.
LYONS, THIRD SECTOR, supra note 26, at 115-18.
Lyons, Government and the Nonprofit Sector, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR,
36.
supra note 29, at 255.
37.
Lyons et al., Australia, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 6, at 203.
Id. at 209.
38.
Id. at 212.
39.
Id. at 213.
40.
Lyons, Government and the Nonprofit Sector, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR,
41.
supra note 29, at 262.
42.
Id. at 263.
43.
Lyons et al., Australia, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 6, at 212.
McGregor-Lowndes, Australia, in STUDIES, supra note 28, at 232-33.
44.
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donated approximately AU$210 annually to charity. 45 By 1999,
however, another report indicated a decline in cash donations to
nonprofit organizations. It found that individuals donated more than
46
AU$1.63 billion, an average of approximately AU$133 per taxpayer.
Funds from private philanthropy dominated only international aid
4
organizations and religious organizations. 7
As to the financial resources of Australia's foundation structures,
there currently is no available data. Likewise, there are no figures
available on the number of foundations in Australia today.
Nonetheless, Philanthropy Australia, a membership organization
that functions in part as a resource center, has estimated that
charitable trusts and foundations in combination currently number
"around several thousand. ' 48 That estimate stands in stark contrast
to numbers of nonprofit organizations, including charitable trusts,
reported in 1996 as a result of a project attempting to determine the
dimensions of Australia's nonprofit sector. 49 That report counted
34,456 as the total number of organizations in the nonprofit sector,
50
including 110 charitable trusts.
Regardless of the number of organizations composing Australia's
nonprofit sector, the sector had operating expenditures of between
AU$14.5 billion and AU$19 billion in 1995-1996, which was in the
range of 3% to 5.2% of Australia's gross domestic product. 5 1 The
sector is a major employer, accounting for 6.9% of all employed
persons as of May 1996.52
Additionally, the nonprofit sector
contributed three percent of Australia's gross domestic product in

45.
Givewell Statistics, availableat http://www.givewell.com.au/statistics.asp.
46.
McGregor-Lowndes, Australia, in PHILANTHROPY, supra note 26, at 4
(citing GIVING TRENDS IN AUSTRALIA 2000, 12th Annual O'Keefe and Partners Report).
Australians perceive that the decline in giving is due to changing demographics and
the lack of tax incentives. Id.
47.
Lyons, Government and the Nonprofit Sector, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR,
supra note 29, at 263.
48.
Philanthropy
Australia
Factsheet,
available
at
http://www.
philanthropy.org.au/factsheets/7-05-01-ausfound.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2001).
49.

MARK LYONS & SuSAN HOCKING,

DIMENSIONS OF AUSTRALIA'S THIRD

SECTOR 71-72 (2000) [hereinafter DIMENSIONS].
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 81 (indicating that nonprofit organizations' expenditures were
approximately AU$14.5 billion or three percent of Australia's gross domestic product);
cf. Lyons et al., Australia, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 6, at 204 (stating that
the nonprofit sector expended AU$19 billion or 5.2% of the country's gross domestic
product, but indicating that the value added to the gross domestic product was 3.9% if
accounting only for wages paid to employees and imputed volunteer time). Another
study undertaken at the University of Technology in Sydney estimated that the
nonprofit sector expends AU$27 billion annually, or approximately six percent of
Australia's gross domestic product. Narelle Hooper, Taxing Times Ahead for Charities,
BuS. REV. WKLY., Sept. 3, 1999.
52.
LYONS & HOCKING, DIMENSIONS, supra note 49, at 81.
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1995-1996. 53 Thus, the nonprofit sector as a whole has a significant
role in Australia's economy and in the lives of its residents.
B. Australia'sIncome Taxation Laws Applicable to Nonprofit
Organizationsand Their Donors
In 1884, the State of South Australia enacted the first
comprehensive state income tax legislation. 54
That legislation
contained provisions exempting 'charitable organizations from the
State income taxation. As each state adopted income tax legislation
exempting charitable organizations from taxation, newly formed
charitable trusts blossomed. 5 5 The federation of states that formed
the federal government subsequently enacted the Income Tax
Assessment Act of 1936, which exempted broad categories of
nonprofit "charitable" institutions 56 from federal income taxation
pursuant to section 23.57 Since that time, the states' income tax

53.
Id.
54.
South Australia was the first State with the Taxation Act 1884 and the
Commonwealth's income tax provisions closely followed the State's exemption provision
in section 23 of Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). See McGregor-Lowndes, Does
Charity Begin and End at Home for Tax Exemptions?, supra note 7.
55.
Id.; Philanthropy in Australia, available at www.philanthropy.org.
au/history.htm. England's law of charity was applied as part of Australia's general
body of common law and equity. DAL PONT, supra note 32, at 57. Although charities
providing welfare services were established from the early 1800s, their creation
substantially increased during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Id.
56.
The appropriate meaning of the term "charitable" institution was raised by
the Industry Commission-now the Productivity Commission-in its 1995 report.
INDUSTRY COMMISSION, CHARITABLE ORGANISATIONS IN AUSTRALIA, Rept. No. 45,
AGPS, Melbourne, June 16, 1995. Following release of the 1995 report, the Industry
Commission undertook a study in an attempt to ascertain what the appropriate
meaning of "charitable" institution should be. The 2001 Sheppard report suggests that
the meaning should include, but should not be limited to public benevolent institutions.
SHEPPARD, at 258. However, discussion of this term and of the report is beyond the
scope of this Article.
57.
The categories of exempt organizations under § 23 of the Income Tax
Assessment Act of 1936 (ITAA of 1936) included: religious, scientific, charitable, or
public educational institutions (§ 23e) that cannot be for the purpose of making a profit
and is not formed for the purposes of benefiting a narrow section of community;
organizations for the relief of poverty that benefit a class of people; organizations for
the advancement of education; organizations for the advancement of religion that has a
religious purpose and benefits the community; organizations for community welfare
which have purposes analogous to those of Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601 and are
for public benefit; public and nonprofit hospitals (§ 23ea); hospital and medical benefits
organizations (§ 23eb); Thalidomide Foundation (§ 23ec); trade unions and associations
of employees (§ 23f); friendly societies (§ 23gi); societies, associations, or clubs
established for musical purposes, or for the encouragement of music, art, science, or
literature (§ 23gii); clubs for community purposes (§ 23gv); and funds established by
will or trust for public charitable purposes or scientific research through a public
university or hospital (§ 23j). Sandra Rodman & Myles McGregor-Lowndes, Income
Tax Exemptions for Non-profit Associations, in LEGAL ISSUES FOR NON-PROFIT
ASSOCIATIONS 121-34 (Myles McGregor-Lowndes et al. eds., 1996).
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exemptions and the federal income tax exemption have remained in
place for "income tax exempt charities." 58
In an attempt to philosophically and financially encourage
philanthropy and to provide expanded philanthropic vehicles to
achieve this goal, the Australian Prime Minister initiated a businesscommunity partnership initiative. 59 In addition to non-pecuniary
benefits, the media has reported that the portion of the measure
permitting an income tax deduction for inter vivos gifts of property of
more than AU$5,000 "could initially increase donations by around
60
AU$45 million per annum and by a larger amount over time."
In an attempt to simplify the federal income tax laws, the
Australian government has been rewriting some provisions since
1993. The rewrite project, known as the Tax Law Improvement
Project, was intended to rewrite the federal income tax laws in order
to institute a new tax system, but the intention has not been fully
realized. To date, income tax provisions integral to deductibility of
gifts by donors and to excludability affecting income of qualified
income tax exempt charities have been revised. The project also has
61
resulted in modest liberalization of these areas.

58.
The current federal income tax exemption was re-enacted as part of the
ITTA of 1997, Division 50; §§ 50-1 though 50-70. Pursuant to the federal tax statutes,
neither ordinary-type income nor capital gains of nonprofit organizations are subject to
taxation. Unlike the United States, where unrelated business income is subject to
taxation pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 511-514, there is no unrelated taxable business income
under Australia's income tax laws. Scholars have suggested that to tax income earned
by a charitable nonprofit organization, regardless of the source of the income, would
theoretically be difficult to justify based on the notion that such income contributes to
financing the primary purposes of the nonprofit organization. See McGregor-Lowndes,
Australia, in STUDIES, supra note 28, at 235 (citing Ole Gjems-Onstad, Money Pouring
out of its Ears: On the Taxation of Really Profitable Nonprofit Organisations in
Australia, Program on Non-profit Corporations Working Paper No. 28, 1993,
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, at 2).
Charitable organizations also may be exempt from other direct taxes. For example,
fringe benefits provided in respect of employment of employees by public benevolent
institutions are exempt from fringe benefits taxes. Fringe Benefits Tax Assessment
Act 1986, § 57A(1). Additionally, many of these organizations may be exempt from
indirect taxes, such as sales taxes and payroll taxes. DAL PONT, supra note 32, at 9697.
59.
See The Prime Minister's Community Business Partnership, CCH
Announcement, Nov. 30, 1999, available at http://www.partnership.zip.com.au/ and
http://www.pm.gov.aulnews/media-relieases/2001/media-release887.htm (stating that
a Community Business Partnership will be established to broker major philanthropic
and partnership efforts between business, government and communities). The idea of
these partnerships is to encourage the nonpecuniary involvement of business
executives in social needs of communities. Id.
60.
See id. (referring to ITAA of 1997, Division 30, § 30-15 (1999)).
61.
Givewell Surveys, New Tax Measures to Encourage Philanthropy, Apr.
1999, available at http://www.givewell.com.au/survey-apr99_2.asp.
Additionally,
under Australia's Cultural Gifts Program, to encourage philanthropy by private art
collectors and others, special statutes exempt capital gain from the gift of property to a
qualified cultural institution, and income tax donation deductions are available to
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The revised income tax laws do not entitle all nonprofit
organizations to federal income tax exemption. Today, the following
broad categories of nonprofit organizations are tax exempt under the
federal income tax laws: 62 (1) charitable institutions, 63 (2) religious
institutions, s 4 (3) scientific institutions,6 5 (4) public educational
institutions, 66 (5) funds established for charitable purposes by will
before July 1, 1997,67 (6) certain testamentary trusts, 68 other funds,
69
including certain public funds and prescribed private funds
established in Australia for public charitable purposes by will or
instrument of trust,7 0 (7) funds established to enable scientific
research to be conducted by or in conjunction with a public university
or hospital, 71 and (8) societies, associations, and clubs established for
the encouragement of science. 72 The sixth category is among the
recent statutory changes. It expands the category, which previously
was limited to funds that actively sought financial support by the
now include "prescribed private
broad public-public funds 73-to
funds" as entitled to the federal income tax exemption. The
prescribed private fund, a previously non-existent Australian
philanthropy vehicle, is functionally similar to U.S. private
foundations.
The core provisions of the federal income tax laws affecting
excludability of income by endorsed "income tax exempt charities"
and deductibility of gifts by donors to qualified "deductible gift
recipients" 74 do not provide complete overlap of these nonprofit

donors unless the gift is testamentary or is an interest in land or a building. ITAA of
1997 § 118-60(2); M2 Presswire, Australian Government, Tax Incentives a Major Boost
for Cultural Sector, Mar. 29, 1999, available at http://www.pm.gov.au/news/
mediareleases/200l/media release887.htm.
The income tax exemption applies to both "statutory income" and "ordinary
62.
income." In some cases, the exempt income is subject to special conditions. ITAA of
1997, Division 50, Subdivision 50-A, § 50-1.
63.
ITAA of 1997, Division 50, Subdivision 50-A, § 50-5, item 1.1; §§ 50-50 and
50-52.
64.
ITAA of 1997, Division 50, Subdivision 50-A, § 50-5, item 1.2; § 50-50.
ITAA of 1997, Division 50, Subdivision 50-A, § 50-5, item 1.3; § 50-55.
65.
ITAA of 1997, Division 50, Subdivision 50-A, § 50-5, item 1.4; § 50-55.
66.
67.
ITAA of 1997, Division 50, Subdivision 50-A, § 50-5, item 1.5; § 50-52 and
50-57.
ITAA of 1997, Division 50, Subdivision 50-A, § 50-5, item 1.5A; § 50-52 and
68.
50-60.
69.
See supra notes 9-10 (explaining the terms "public fund" and "prescribed
private fund").
70.
ITAA of 1997, Division 50, Subdivision 50-A, § 50-5, item 1.5B; § 50-52 and
50-50.
71.
ITAA of 1997, Division 50, Subdivision 50-A,§ 50-5, item 1.6; § 50-65.
ITAA of 1997, Division 50, Subdivision 50-A, § 50-5, item 1.7; § 50-70.
72.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing public funds).
73.
74.
In 1995, the Industry Commission had expressed concern that the only
donations that could be deducted by donors were those made to charitable
organizations that distribute funds to organizations with tax-deductible status. The
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organizations. In other words, unlike in the United States and the
United Kingdom, tax-exempt status in Australia does not equate
Statutorily identified
with, or even relate to, tax deductibility.
categories of nonprofit organizations entitled to be deductible gift
recipients now include funds or institutions involving health,
education, research, welfare and rights, defense, industry, trade and
design, the family, international affairs, sports and recreation,
75
philanthropic trusts, and cultural and environmental institutions;
certain public funds and prescribed private funds;7 6 registered
78
vv
political parties; public libraries, museums, and art galleries;
specified organizations registered with the National Trust; 79 and the
Commonwealth." ° With the addition of the prescribed private funds,
beginning July 1, 1999, individuals, families, and corporations can
gift assets to a fund without seeking broad financial support for the
fund and can legitimately claim a federal income tax deduction for
the gift. 8 '
Today, individual donors enjoy an income tax deduction for cash
gift donations of at least AU$2 to public funds and prescribed private
funds.8 2
The amount of this deduction is only subject to the
limitation that it cannot create or increase a current year loss
because the deduction is limited to the amount of the donor's
assessable income less other deductions and any loss carried forward
from prior years.8 3 Individuals are also entitled to an income tax
deduction, spread over five years, for inter vivos donations of property
having a fair market value of more than AU$5,000, regardless of
when the property was purchased.8 4 Nonetheless, if such donated
property is capital gain property, the donor is subject to capital gains

Commission recommended that a wider range of charities receive status as deductible
gift recipients. INDUSTRY COMMISSION, supra note 56, at 252-53.
Australia does not currently impose a gift tax on intervivos transfers or an estate
tax on transfers at death. Therefore, Australians do not benefit from a gift tax or
estate tax deduction for gifts.
75.
ITAA of 1997, Division 30, Subdivision 30-A, § 30-15, item 1, and
Subdivision 30-B, §§ 30-20 to 30-105.
76.
ITAA of 1997, Division 30, Subdivision 30-A, § 30-15, item 2. These funds
must be endorsed by the A.T.O. under Subdivision 30-BA or must be owned by one or
more persons who constitute a government entity that is endorsed by the A.T.O. under
Subdivision 30-BA. Id. § 30-17. For definitions of public funds and prescribed private
funds, see supra note 9-10 and accompanying text.
ITAA of 1997, Division 30, Subdivision 30-A, § 30-15, item 3.
77.
ITAA of 1997, Division 30, Subdivision 30-A, § 30-15, item 4.
78.
ITAA of 1997, Division 30, Subdivision 30-A, § 30-15, item 6.
79.
80.
ITAA of 1997, Division 30, Subdivision 30-A, § 30-15, item 5.
81.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text (referring to prescribed private
funds).
82.
ITAA of 1997, Division 30, Subdivision 30-A, § 30-15, item 2.
83.
ITAA of 1997, Division 30, § 26-55 (1999).
84.
ITAA of 1997, Division 30, § 30-15 (1999). The amount deductible is the
value determined by the Commissioner of the A.T.O. Id.
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85
By contrast, if
tax on its appreciation if the transfer is inter vivos.
capital gain property having a fair market value in excess of
gift
AU$5,000 is transferred by testamentary gift to a deductible
86

recipient, the capital gains are exempt from income taxation.

In recent years, Australia's federal government has encouraged
87
With the
businesses to engage in philanthropic endeavors.

exception of the prescribed private funds provisions, however, the
federal government has not provided specific and affirmative
encouragement to corporations in the form of a federal income tax
88
As one
deduction for donations, whether made in cash or in-kind.

scholar has stated:
The law of corporations in both England and Australia does not
facilitate corporations making pure philanthropic gifts. A director or
senior executive risks breaching his or her duty to act in good faith in
the interests of the company if he or she authorizes a donation in
circumstances where there is no obvious [potential pecuniary] benefit89
direct or indirect-for the company's shareholders.

C. Legal Forms of Australia'sNonprofit Organizations
As in the United States,9 0 creation of a new nonprofit
organization can be accomplished through the choice of one of several

ITAA of 1997, Division 30, § 30-15 (1999).
85.
Id.
86.
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
87.
It, however, should be noted that under the ordinary principles of ITAA of
88.
1936, § 51 (now ITAA of 1997, § 8-1), a company, as opposed to an individual, could
claim a gift deduction.
Myles McGregor-Lowndes, Regulatory Infrastructure for Nonprofit
89.
Organisations,Working Paper No. 97, Aug. 2000, at 13 (citing Hutton (1883) 23 Ch D
654) [hereinafter Regulatory Infrastructure]. This is not something that has lacked
legal attention in Australia, a chapter being devoted to it in Legal Issues for Non-Profit
Associations. The recent report by the Centre for Corporate Law and Securities
Regulation at the University of Melbourne also considered the issue. S. Fisher,
Corporations as Donors: A Legal Survey in LEGAL ISSUES FOR NON-PROFIT
ASSOCIATIONS (McGregor-Lowndes, Fletcher & Sievers eds., 1996); J. Vernon, Political
Donations by Australian Companies, Centre for Law and Securities Regulation, The
University of Melbourne, Melbourne, 2000. In 1999, it was reported that compared to
1998, corporate philanthropy had declined twenty percent. See McGregor-Lowndes,
Australia, in PHILANTHROPY, supra note 26, at 5 (citing GIVING TRENDS IN AUSTRALIA
2000, 12th Annual O'Keefe and Partners Rept.). Note, however, that an argument
could be made that corporate gifts enhance goodwill and therefore benefit the entity
and its shareholders.
In the United States, nonprofit organizations are formed under the laws of
90.
the states. A charitable nonprofit organization can be formed as a charitable trust or
as a nonprofit corporation. For a discussion of the impact that choice of legal form has
with respect to fiduciary duties of decision-makers of nonprofit organizations, see Nina
J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation's Governance and Self-Interested
Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093 (2001) [hereinafter
Private Foundation'sGovernance].
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legal forms. 9 1 An Australian nonprofit organization can be created as
an unincorporated association, 92 a corporation by Royal Charter or by
private act of Parliament, 93 a corporation under general national
corporation laws, 94 an incorporated association, 95 or a charitable

91.
See generally McGregor-Lowndes, Australia, in PHILANTHROPY, supra note
26, at 50-71.
92.
Unincorporated associations had their genesis in the modern laws of
England, passed by Parliament in 1799, implicitly recognizing the freedom of
association for any lawful purpose.
Keith Fletcher, Developing Appropriate
Organisational Structures for Non-profit Associations, in LEGAL ISSUES FOR NONPROFIT ASSOCIATIONS 4 (McGregor-Lowndes, Fletcher, & Sievers eds., 1996)
[hereinafter Developing, in LEGAL ISSUES]. They are unincorporated groups, which can
be small in number or larger more formal groups. Because not incorporated, their
creation is not costly and their structures are flexible. An unincorporated association
has no separate legal persona from its members. McGregor-Lowndes, Australia, in
PHILANTHROPY, supra note 26, at 54-57. It cannot sue or be sued, but its committees
and officers assume primary liability for the association's obligations. Id. An
unincorporated association is not required to register with a state unless they have
more than twenty members and carry on a business in more than one state or territory.
Id. Therefore, most unincorporated associations are subject to little regulation and
have little public accountability. Id.
93.
Corporations by Royal Charter or by private act of Parliament are limited
in number, in part because this status is costly to obtain. These types of corporations
generally are not a viable alternative when creating a nonprofit income tax exempt
charity. Fletcher, Developing, in LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 92, at 4-5.
94.
Most large nonprofit organizations are incorporated under general national
corporation laws, usually in the form of a corporation limited by guarantee, by which
members guarantee the debts of the organization on its dissolution up to a sum certain.
The guarantee terminates on the resignation of a guarantor, but the liability persists
for debts of corporation incurred before resignation for one year after the guarantor's
resignation. Fletcher, Developing, in LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 92, at 6. Otherwise,
the corporation limited by guarantee has attributes and obligations of other public
companies under Corporation Laws. Id.
Nonprofits incorporated under §§ 150-151 of Corporations Act of 2001 can be
formed for charitable purposes. Under the predecessor provision, § 383 of the
Corporations law, nonprofit organizations could be incorporated for the purpose of
providing "recreation or amusement or promoting commerce, industry, art, science,
religion, charity, patriotism .... or any object useful to the community; will apply its
profits (if any) or other income in promoting its objects; and will prohibit the payment
of any dividend to its members." McGregor-Lowndes, Australia, in PHILANTHROPY,
supra note 26, at 58. The corporation must have a board of directors. Fletcher,
Developing, in LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 92, at 6. The nonprofit corporation must
register with Australian Securities Commission. McGregor-Lowndes, Australia, in
PHILANTHROPY, supra note 26, at 69. The corporation is subject to more rigorous and
comprehensive reporting requirements than for incorporated associations. The
corporation must submit financial statements to Australian Securities Commission.
Id.
There are several reasons that this legal form is not a preferred option: (1) the word
"Ltd" must appear after name of organization (although an application can be made for
removal of the term); (2) the corporation must keep its registered office open for at least
three hours each business day (although this requirement can be circumvented by
having another company's office be the registered office); and (3) there are significant
direct costs of incorporation and costs in maintaining corporate status. Fletcher,
Developing, in LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 92, at 7.
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trust.9 6 While qualifying "income tax exempt charities" created under

one of these legal forms are entitled to income tax exemption under
the federal tax statutes, the choice of legal form impacts their
registration and reporting requirements, their regulation, the parties
responsible for monitoring and enforcing laws and regulations, the

Incorporated associations are organizations that have a separate legal
95.
persona. That trait limits the liability of its committee members and governing body.
Committee members and governing board members are bound by fiduciary duties
under common law or pursuant to the association's constitution, including the duty to
act with reasonable care and diligence without personal pecuniary benefit, the duty to
disclose any direct or indirect interests in contract with association; and the duty not to
vote on matters in which committee member is an interested party. Fletcher,
Developing, in LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 92, at 12-13. Each state has separate laws
and reporting requirements. The majority of Australia's states require a minimum
number of members and a constitution with provisions conforming to established
guidelines. McGregor-Lowndes, Australia, in PHILANTHROPY, supra note 26, at 63.
There are three forms of external controls: (1) regulators can conduct inspections in
accordance with state statutes; (2) incorporation can be cancelled when the association
is inactive or its activities are inconsistent with nonprofit status; and (3) authorities
can remove from the state register an incorporated association considered unsuited for
continued registration, by reason of size, extent of trading activities, or public dealings.
Fletcher, supra note 92, at 15. Incorporated associations are often the preferred legal
form of choice for nonprofit organizations having religious, charitable, or benevolent

purposes.
96.
Charitable trusts must have a charitable purpose of the relief of poverty,
advancement of education, advancement of religion, or other purpose beneficial to
community. McGregor-Lowndes, Australia, in PHILANTHROPY, supra note 26, at 58.
They can carry on commercial activity that benefits the charitable purposes of the
trust, but such activity cannot benefit the trustees. Id. Trust documents are private
and need not be filed for public viewing. Id. Charitable trusts are not required to
register with the state or territory in which formed, but they may be required to
register for tax law purposes. Id. Public accountability of charitable trusts is limited;
accountability largely rests with the trustees of the trust. Id. at 60. Although relator
actions may be brought, the states and territories Attorneys General act as the general
supervisor of charitable trusts, but they generally only attempt to ensure that
charitable trusts are not organized and operated for impossible purposes or have not
become inactive. Id. The A.T.O. does not require charitable trusts to file informational
tax returns. The A.T.O. requires charitable trusts to annually distribute a substantial
portion of their income, generally considered at least seventy-five percent. A.T.O.
Ruling No. IT 340. This rule is aimed at reducing the use of charitable trusts for tax
minimization purposes.
But, this position severely limits a trust's ability to
accumulate capital for programs and projects, since no more than fifteen percent of the
revenues of a charitable trust would be available to be expended for administrative
purposes or reinvested in capital for the use of the organization. Id.
Charitable trusts have a governing body of trustees whose successors are
determined in accordance with the trust deed. McGregor-Lowndes, Australia, in
PHILANTHROPY, supra note 26, at 60. The trustees hold assets in trust and manage
them pursuant to their fiduciary duties under state laws and common law. Id. While
trustees are personally accountable under these fiduciary duties, historically few cases
have been brought by the attorney general or by relators under the supervision of an
attorney general. Charitable trusts can exist for fixed period or for indefinite period.
Thus, charitable trusts are the only category of trust that have perpetual succession
rather than a limited life span. McGregor-Lowndes, Regulatory Infrastructure, supra
note 89.
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liability of their officers and key decision-makers, and the fiduciary
97
standards applicable to officers and members of governing bodies.
D. Australia's Statutory Environment and Culture Account for the
Early Developmental Stage of Its Nonprofit Sector

The environment and culture in which Australia's nonprofit
organizations operate is far different from the United States. When

viewed in the aggregate, these differences may account for the fact
that the developmental stage of Australia's nonprofit sector currently
is less regulated than that of the United States.
1. Wealth and Philanthropic Culture
The scope and wealth of Australia's nonprofit sector are not fully
known, 98 but their magnitude is significantly less than that of the
United States. 99 There are relatively few nonprofit entities in
Australia, 10 0 and the wealth massed in these institutions does not
approach that found in U.S. and English nonprofit sectors. There are
numerous reasons. Since its inception, Australia has not had a high
concentration of wealth. It has had far fewer wealthy individuals and
entities than the United States. Additionally, unlike the United
States where the federal government provides gift and estate tax
deduction incentives for charitable donations to qualifying nonprofit
organizations, 10 1 Australia repealed its federal gift and estate
transfer taxes in the 1980s, and thus, currently has no such tax
stimulus. Moreover, Australia has a culture of supporting nonprofit
projects through volunteerism rather than through pecuniary
02
giving.'

97.
See INDUSTRY COMMISSION, supra note 56, at 203 (table showing different
reporting
requirements for each state);
McGregor-Lowndes, Australia, in
PHILANTHROPY, supra note 26, at 51-57.
98.
See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
See also McGregorLowndes, Australia, in PHILANTHROPY, supra note 26, at 4.
99.
Even when limited to charitable trusts and foundations in Australia, the
Industry Commission noted that they are not as significant in Australia as in the
United States or the United Kingdom. INDUSTRY COMMISSION, supra note 56, at 247.
100.
On a relative basis, there are very few large nonprofit entities and many
small, rather new, nonprofit organizations.
McGregor-Lowndes, Australia, in
PHILANTHROPY, supra note 26, at 60.
Community foundations, funds that derive their resources from multiple donors
and that expend those funds with respect to charitable projects in a particular
geographic location, were almost nonexistent until the late 1990s. David Cohen,
Community Funds Down Under Tackle Issues Facing Rural Areas, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY, Oct. 18, 2001, at 7. Today, community foundations are the fastest
growing philanthropic recipients in Australia. Id.
101.
I.R.C. § 2055 (e); § 2522(c)(3).
102.
Lyons et al., Australia, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 6, at 203-12. In
2000, approximately 4.4 million Australians of at least eighteen years of age,
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Nonetheless, in recent years, an Australian tradition of wealthy
individuals creating and donating funds to private charitable trusts
for distribution to, and use for, public benevolent purposes has been
developing. Yet, one Australian researcher found that high net worth
Australians are not considerably more generous than persons of
lesser financial means. 10 3 This researcher suggested that, although
in 1997 Australians' gift donations were estimated to be between
AU$2 billion and AU$2.5 billion annually, 10 4 Australians have not
05
ranked among the most generous philanthropists in the world.'
What this researcher did not explain is that the Australian culture
generally has promoted volunteerism but has frowned upon selfpromotion by philanthropists. Therefore, to a large extent, this
culture has not engendered philanthropy for the sake of personal gain
or personal recognition by others. The relative absence of this
attribute, along with the dearth of wealthy residents, may help to
elucidate not only why Australians have not ranked among the
world's most generous philanthropists but also why there may be
relatively little incentive to financially support nonprofit
organizations.
2. Complex Tax Statutes and Tightly Controlled Philanthropic
Vehicles
As discussed above, Australia's nonprofit sector and potential
donors are faced with a maze of complex statutes, both state and

representing nearly one-third of the civilian population in that age group, volunteered
during 2000. AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 4441.0 VOLUNTARY WORK, AUSTRALIA,
available at http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsfLookupfNTOOOIAAOE.htm. They
contributed approximately 704.1 million hours of voluntary work. Id. The number of
volunteers in the same age group had increased since 1995 when just under 3.2 million
were volunteers, which represented approximately twenty-four percent of the same
population. Id. Between 1980 and 1995, the percentage of the Australian adult
population that volunteered had declined. LYONS, THIRD SECTOR, supra note 26, at 104.
103.
See Narelle Hooper, Now That You Have Made It, Perhaps The Time Has
Come To Give It Away, BUS. REV. WKLY., Dec. 22, 1997, at 52 (referring to Mark Lyons,
Director of the Centre of Australian Community Organisations and Management,
University of Technology, Sydney, Australia).
The estimated amounts of these gift donations is substantially less than
104.
other estimates of giving for the same year. Mark Lyons, Director of Centre of
Australian Community Organisations and Management, University of Technology,
reported in 2000 that giving by individuals in 1997 was over AU$3 billion and giving
by corporations approximated AU$1.67 billion in that same year. LYONS & HOCKING,
DIMENSIONS, supra note 49, at 101. The disparity in the numbers may be explainable
by the fact that not all individuals are entitled to or do claim the gifts as deductible
donations, and until recently, there was no philanthropy vehicle by which corporations
could make charitable donations. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing
prescribed private funds).
105.
See Hooper, supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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federal. 10 6 These provisions are complex in their minutia and detail.
The complexity of these provisions alone may have been, and may
continue to be, a daunting impediment to the development of the
nonprofit sector. The growth potential of the nonprofit sector likely
was curbed significantly, however, because prescribed private funds
became available as a philanthropic vehicle only two years ago to
potential donors, who, until then, could contribute financially only to
publicly supported nonprofit organizations.
E. FiduciaryImproprieties, Tax Abuse, and the Nonprofit Sector
Three questions were researched and asked of numerous
academics, employees of the A.T.O., and decision-makers of nonprofit
organizations: (1) whether creators and governing bodies of nonprofit
organizations have violated the spirit or letter of the laws conferring
special tax status on an organization as an income tax exempt charity
or as a deductible gift recipient, (2) whether such persons had
violated fiduciary duties owed to the nonprofit organizations, and (3)
whether prescribed private funds are susceptible to similar problems.
Frequently the response to each question was affirmative.
Australia has an unstated protective culture of institutional
silence that prevails among nonprofit organizations when scandals
surface. This culture minimizes the knowledge of the public about
improprieties, and thereby protects innocent nonprofit institutions
from collateral potential harm. Similarly, the A.T.O. has a strictly
enforced code of privacy with respect to taxation matters. 10 7 By law,
the A.T.O. is required to settle taxation matters in strict privacy
unless it pursues the matters in court.10 8 There appears to be a

106.
See supra notes 61-85 and accompanying text.
107.
The United States Internal Revenue Service also is statutorily prohibited
from disclosing information concerning the identity of a § 501(c)(3) organization or
findings of questionable or abusive activities uncovered in audit or otherwise. See
LR.C. § 6103. Most § 501(c)(3) organizations, however, are required to file an annual
information tax return, Form 990 for public charities and Form 990-PF for private
foundations. See I.R.C. § 6033(a). To encourage accountability of § 501(c)(3)
organizations to the public, Congress enacted the disclosure rules of I.R.C. § 6104(e).
The statute requires the organizations to make available for public inspection a copy of
its application for tax exemption and their Form 990s or Form 990-PFs for three years.
The statute exempts from disclosure, however, names of contributors and information
that the Treasury Department considers might adversely affect the organization.
I.R.C. § 6104(e)(3).
108.
ITAA of 1936, § 16. Additionally, the Privacy Act of 1988 and taxation acts
See
protect as confidential personal information collected by the A.T.O.
http:/www.austli.edu.au/. But, note that ITAA of 1936, § 14(1) requires the "Commissioner
[of the A.T.O. to] ... prepare and furnish... [an annual report] ... including any breaches
or evasions of this Act of which the Commissioner has notice." The A.T.O.'s 1980-81 Annual
Report included sixty-four pages listing taxpayers caught offending the Act during the prior
year, whereas the Annual Report of more recent years have not. Perhaps the A.T.O. fails to
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direct link between decisions by the A.T.O. to initiate prosecutions
and privacy considerations. It is unclear whether a combination of
the privacy laws and a lack of belief that cases of tax abuse are a real
and important threat to the revenue base has contributed to the
A.T.O.'s failure to dedicate large amounts of resources to audits and
litigation. Nonetheless, information has not flowed from the A.T.O. to
persons outside the institution in which infractions of fiduciary duties
have been detected, and the A.T.O. has quietly settled all but a few
exceptional cases. For the most part, leaks have been contained, and
the Australian media has largely refrained from investigative
reporting that would uncover and publicize abuses within the
nonprofit sector. The silence, however, is a curtain that does veil
improprieties, and the curtain has been pierced infrequently for
occasions considered particularly egregious.
A number of cases bear out the fact that Australia's nonprofit
sector has experienced significant problems associated with breaches
of fiduciary behavior and tax abuse concerns of a magnitude that the
A.T.O. could not overlook or settle quietly.' 0 9
One infamous
illustrative case is Bray v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation.1l0 In
that case, a Brisbane solicitor, Peter William Bray, entered into a
series of transactions whereby Bray and three friends-to whom Bray
transferred funds for the endeavor-established a trust fund named
"The Sportsmens and Businessmens Benevolent Foundation"
(Foundation).
The recital to the trust deed for the Foundation
provided that:
The founder [Mr. Bray] wishes to establish a [charitable] public fund
exclusively for the purposes of providing money, property or benefits to
or for funds, authorities and institutions referred to and for purposes
referred to in any of the sub-paragraphs of section 78(1)(a) of the
Income Tax Assessment Act [that is, charitable public funds qualifying
as deductible gift recipients] ... and for the establishment of any such
I
funds, authorities and institutions.11
The trustees were bound by this intent in the use and application of
trust assets. 112 Bray also purchased one hundred percent of the

utilize its powers of disclosure and is not as constrained by privacy requirements as some
believe.
109.
See Leary v. Fed. Comm'r of Taxation, 80 ATC 4438 (1980); Mahony v. Fed.
Comm'r of Taxation, 10 AITR 463 (1967); Compton v. Fed. Comm'r of Taxation, (1966)
10 AITR 282; Scott v. Fed. Comm'r of Taxation, 10 AITR 290 (1966); Luceria
Investments Pty. Ltd. v. Fed. Comm'r of Taxation, (1975) 5 A.T.R. 380. See
Commonwealth Bank of Austl. v. Friedrich & Ors, 5 ACSR 115 (1991) (a breach of
fiduciary case not involving taxation). See also Gibelman & Gelman, supra note 5
(listing three incidents in 2000 in Australia involving Youth Motor Sport Foundation,
Wesley Mission, and Brisbane's Royal Hospital).
110.
Bray v. Fed. Comm'r of Taxation, (1978) 140 CLR 560.
111.
Id. at 569.
112.
Id.
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outstanding shares in a company, M.B.J. Constructions Pty. Ltd.
(M.B.J.), 113 the only asset of which was AU$45,240 cash and which
had no liabilities. Bray was appointed chairman of the board of
Without complete
trustees and president of the Foundation.
disclosure by Bray of his intended dealings for M.B.J.'s cash, the
Foundation's board of trustees approved Bray's donation of his M.B.J.
shares to the Foundation in addition to AU$100.11 4 Bray claimed the
value-AU$44,107--of the shares as a deductible gift for federal
income tax purposes. Subsequently, part of the cash in M.B.J.'s bank
account was indirectly made available to and used by Trumper
Finance Pty. Ltd. (Trumper) to repay its creditors. This facilitated
Trumper's lending activities. Bray controlled and beneficially owned
Trumper. The remainder of the cash in M.B.J.'s bank account was
made available to Bray interest-free and was used by him for
personal purposes. 115
The Federal Court of Australia, General Division-Australia's
federal court to which the case had been appealed from the Supreme
Court of Victoria-addressed whether Bray's transfer of the M.B.J.
shares to the Foundation was a "gift"'116 and whether the transfer was
to a "public fund" established and maintained for the purposes that
would qualify it as a deductible gift recipient. Chief Judge Bowen
and Judge Sweeney found that the transfer constituted a "gift."
Although acknowledging that Bray derived advantages from the form
of the conveyance-transfer of M.B.J. stock to the Foundation,
thereby permitting retention within M.B.J. of cash for subsequent use
by Trumper and its controlling shareholder, Bray-Chief Judge
Bowen found that the transfer constituted a gift rather than a quid
pro quo transaction. Nonetheless, over the dissent of Judge Deane,
Chief Judge Bowen and Judge Sweeney determined that the
Foundation was not a "public fund," "established and maintained" for
benevolent purposes benefiting the public. Chief Judge Bowen and
Judge Sweeney made this determination based on a variety of factors:
the Foundation's income source was essentially one individual-and
not the larger citizenry-its control and management were in the
hands of a few private persons; and, in violation of Bray's fiduciary
duties as a trustee of the Foundation, the structure permitted
conflicts of interest ending in private advantage.

All but one share in the company, M.B.J. Constructions Pty. Ltd., were
113.
transferred to Bray. The remaining share was transferred to Trumper Finance Pty.
Ltd., a company controlled by Bray and beneficially owned by him. Id.
114.
Bray had informed that he would make best efforts to see that the company
paid dividends on the donated shares. In fact, none of the self-dealing transactions
between the company, another company owned by Bray, and by Bray himself were
disclosed to the other trustees. Id.
Bray utilized the money to pay his personal income taxes. Id.
115.
116.
Entitlement to a deduction for a "gift" to a qualified public fund requires a
showing that there was a "gift" within the meaning of ITAA of 1936, § 78(1)(a).
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On appeal, the High Court of Australia focused not on whether
the transfer was a "gift,"117 but on whether the Foundation was a
public fund properly established and maintained exclusively for
benevolent public purposes. Of the five appellate judges, four judges
concluded that the Foundation was not a public fund and thus Bray's
Chief Judge Barwick
appeal for the deduction was dismissed.
determined that the Foundation neither originated in a public
initiative nor proceeded in an effective endeavor to attract public
financial participation. Holding that the Foundation was at no time
established and maintained for "public" benefit, he stated that "the
only effect" of Bray's transfers to the Foundation was to
provide the appellant with a deduction from his assessable income. The
fund [Foundation] cannot be said to exist as a means of producing
assistance for a specified object. The appellant minded to assist any of
The fund existed at
those objects could have done so directly....
material times solely as a vehicle for the justification of the deduction
118
by the appellant.
Chief Judge Barwick also drew upon the policy of the statute to
support his conclusion. He wrote:
The evident purpose of § 78 is to encourage the support by the public of
the objects specified in the sub-paragraph of that section by
contribution of sums of varying amounts to a fund which, by
aggregating them, can significantly assist one or more specified objects.
The provision of the deduction is for the implementation of that
policy....,119
Judge Mason strongly agreed, indicating that "the present case is not
' 120
a marginal case.
Citing legislative intent, Judge Jacobs repeated the sentiment of
Chief Judge Barwick:
It is not the legislative intention that a private person could establish a
fund by making gifts of money or property to trustees for the prescribed
Such private
[statutory] purposes and thereby claim a deduction ....
person could if he wished made deductible gifts directly to any of the
prescribed authorities or institutions. 121
Judge Jacobs expanded:
In my opinion it is not sufficient that the public under the terms of its
establishment may contribute to the fund. [emphasis added] That
being so, it appears to me that it must be the intention of the promoters
or of the founder or founders (if any) that the public will contribute so
that in the case of a fund established by an initial gift from an
individual or a few individuals what is born of the contribution from an

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

In fact, the judges consistently referred to the transfer as a "gift."
Bray, 140 CLR 560, at 565.
Id. at 580.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 575.
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individual or few individuals will blossom into a fund to which the
public in fact subscribe. A fund is a public fund when the purpose of its
establishment is the raising of funds from the public or a significant
section of the public so that the objects will benefit to an extent greater
than the benefit which a founder (if any) confers by his own
122
contribution.
Obviously disturbed by Bray's scheme and bordering on labeling
Bray's scheme as tax abuse, Judge Jacobs referred to the private
nature of the fund in terms of
the power to retain property.in the same form in which it was originally
received without being obliged to sell the same or convert it into money.
That power, in the manner of its exercise, was the lynchpin of the
appellant taxpayer's scheme. For, if the shares were sold, the proceeds
would need to be either applied for the benefit of the expressed
beneficial object of the trust or to be invested in trustee securities.
That would have been fatal to the scheme of having control of the
company [M.S.J.] and consequently of the liquid funds which were the
only assets of that company whose shares were the subject matter of
123
the gift.
From the lowest court to the highest, most judges noted or
implied that Bray's transactions were purely tax motivated. 124 The
Foundation appeared to be an alter-ego for Bray, and the financial
transactions were structured solely to create personal tax deductions
that otherwise could not have been available unless Bray had
dedicated his own cash to a true public fund. Bray's actions appeared
to demonstrate a lack of intention to benefit the community or public.
They also appeared to deceive the tax authorities as well as his handpicked trustees of the Foundation. Clearly, Australia's tax laws and
statutes addressing fiduciary responsibilities are not tolerant of
Moreover, Bray likely utilized his
behavior like that of Bray.
knowledge as a solicitor to undertake aggressive and enterprising tax
planning at the expense of the treasury. Such behavior is contrary to
a desirable moral climate and not within the spirit of the statutory
tax concessions. Cases such as this call out for remedial regulatory
125
mechanisms.
F. Regulation and Accountability of the Nonprofit Sector
In Australia's early years, charitable organizations, often
supported by influential individuals, staved off regulation of their
activities. 12 6 Today, the regulation of Australia's nonprofit sector is

122.
Id. at 576.
123.
Id. at 578.
See id.
124.
125.
See infra notes 249-56 and accompanying text.
126.
See DAL PONT, supra note 32, at 57. Charitable trusts were lightly
regulated in the nineteenth century in most states, but the states passed legislation
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fractured and vulnerable. 127 Nonprofit organizations are regulated
by over seventy different Australian federal statutory provisions and
nearly ten federal administrative agencies are involved in overseeing
the application of these provisions. 128 As one Australian scholar has
stated: "This welter of administrative agencies pales when compared
to the number of statutory provisions and agencies in the states. For
example, in New South Wales there are over 230 statutory provisions
and 15 administrative agencies."'129 Australia's regulatory regime
imposes regulatory oversight of entities by bodies based on the legal
form of the entity, but no such regulatory body exists with respect to
charitable trusts. None of the administrative agencies has the
regulation of nonprofit organizations as its core mission. 130
In addition, regulation by any particular administrative agency
may be tentative. The tentativeness in part appears to be a product
of the "halo effect" associated with nonprofit organizations by the
public. The citizenry purportedly perceives nonprofit organizations
as trustworthy, and perhaps even beyond reproach.' 3 ' This halo
effect causes administrative agencies to tread rather lightly so as not
to be considered as mistreating beloved nonprofit institutions. 3 2 The
agencies' tentativeness may also result from a fear of vulnerability to
politically powerful and wealthy individuals whose potential
influences on job security may be real or imagined. Focusing
particularly on the A.T.O., with respect to business interests, it has
been criticized as a federal agency lacking a strong culture of
professional independence from the entities over which it has

during the late 1800s and 1900s that increased the regulation of charitable trusts. See
id. at 58-78 (explaining the legislation enacted in the states to regulate charitable

trusts).
127.
Although the regulation of the nonprofit sector in the United States is
fractured, it appears that Australia's regulatory structure is more fractured. For a
general discussion of the fractured regulatory structure in the United States, see

Crimm, PrivateFoundation's Governance, supra note 90.
128.
See McGregor-Lowndes, Nonprofit Corporations-Reflections,supra note 4,
at 25. The number of regulatory agencies that have oversight of American nonprofit
entities pales when compared to the number in Australia.
129.
Id. For example, fiduciary duties of directors of incorporated entities are
imposed in the states by general law, the Companies Code and Corporations Acts. See
also DAL PONT, supra note 32, at 265-83 (discussing the jurisdiction and roles of the
attorneys general of the states.)
130.
See McGregor-Lowndes, Nonprofit Corporations-Reflections,supra note 4,
at *19-20.
131.
See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. This halo effect also plays a
role in the perception of America's nonprofit organizations. See generally Crimm,
PrivateFoundation'sGovernance, supra note 90; Henry B. Hansmann, supra note 1, at
580.
132.
See McGregor-Lowndes, Nonprofit Corporations-Reflections,supra note 4,
at *37-38 (citing Michael Chesterman, CHARITIES, TRUSTS AND SOCIAL WELFARE 307
(1979)).
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statutorily been given regulatory authority. 13 3 Whether this criticism
also applies to nonprofit organizations, the A.T.O.'s tentativeness
certainly may be attributable to its perception that the nonprofit
sector operates without a threat to the country's revenue, lack of
trained staff knowledgeable about nonprofit organization matters, its
failure to regularly and extensively audit tax-exempt nonprofit
organizations, and its lack of intelligence capability to discern tax
evasion with respect to donors and nonprofit organizations. This
culture, as well as the criticism of the A.T.O., may also contribute to
its tentative positions and actions.
Over the years, the non-availability of senior management who
perceive accountability to be a pressing issue, the significant lack of
applicable accountability standards, and the failure to impose
comprehensive significant accountability requirements on nonprofit
entities and their governing bodies may have made administrative
agencies' ability to perform their regulatory responsibilities more
difficult. Only recently has Australia's nonprofit sector begun to
emphasize the need for and value of professional managers within its
institutions. The previous inadequacy might have contributed to the
lack of accountability by nonprofit entities.
In 1995, the Industry Commission-now known as the
Productivity Commission-which had undertaken a major study of
charitable organizations in Australia, reported that most nonprofit
organizations, those that the report labeled as community social
welfare organizations, had little public accountability. The Industry
Commission identified as the problems the "lack of consistent data
collection processes, the lack of public access to information, and the
lack of standardisation of financial reporting and other
information." 13 4 Accountability standards for nonprofit entities and
their decision-makers still are virtually nonexistent. Recently, legal
accountability standards, AS 3806-1998, were developed for the
purpose of assisting for-profit organizations in identifying and
remedying deficiencies in their compliance with laws and regulations.
Although easily tailored to the nonprofit environment, to date these
standards have not been adapted for use by nonprofit
5
organizations. 13

133.
See, e.g., Yuri Grbich, After Bellinz and Ralph: A New Focus for Decision
Making in the Australian Tax System (paper on file with author).
134.
INDUSTRY COMMISSION, supra note 56, at 205.
135.
AS 3806-1998 was developed by the Standards Australia Committee QRI14,
Compliance Systems at the request of the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission. The standards provide a framework for a compliance program that can
be monitored and assessed. The standards "aim to assist an entity to prevent, and
where necessary, identify and respond to, breaches of laws, regulations, codes or
organizational standards...; promote a culture of compliance within the organization;
and assist the organization in remaining or becoming a good corporate citizen."
STANDARDS AUSTRALIA, AS 3806-1998.
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It is also notable that Australia's federal tax disclosure
requirements for nonprofit organizations are limited. As of July 1,
2000, to be endorsed as a deductible gift recipient so that an
organization can provide donors a gift deduction receipt, it must
initially apply for endorsement by the A.T.O. 136 Not all organizations
that technically could qualify as a deductible gift recipient have
sought endorsement, however, perhaps because they receive so few
gifts that it is not worth the effort. Deductible gift recipients must
regularly review whether they are entitled to endorsement. 137 An
endorsed deductible gift recipient must notify the A.T.O. if it
subsequently becomes disqualified for that tax status. 138 By contrast,
endorsement is mandatory for a nonprofit organization desiring
income tax exempt status, and no annual registration requirement is
imposed on those organizations. 139 Instead, a self-assessment regime
is in place, and it permits the nonprofit organizations annually to
self-assess whether they fall within one of the categories of
140
As
organizations entitled to the income tax exempt charity status.
part of this self-assessment system, the A.T.O. has attempted to
begin to build a culture of compliance with publication of a series of
booklets, including the "Charity Pack" and the "Gift Pack," which
include self-assessment work sheets.141
Australia does not require nonprofit organizations to file annual
informational federal tax returns with the A.T.O. 142 The absence of a
filing requirement allows nonprofit organizations to be virtually selfregulating for purposes of federal income tax laws. Although the
A.T.O. can review and audit a nonprofit organization, it has done so
irregularly and only to ensure that an organization deserves its selfassessed income tax exempt charity status. 143 Thus, as a practical
minimal audit
matter, with respect to income taxation, currently 14only
4
A.T.O.
the
by
out
carried
are
processes
and review
For the most part, at least for federal income tax purposes,
Australia's nonprofit organizations, including its prescribed private
funds, operate in a permissive and inefficient regulatory

136.

ITAA of 1997, Subdivision 30-BA, §§ 30--115 to 30-180.

See also

AUSTRALIAN TAXATION OFFICE, GIFT PACK, May 2000, at 2-9.

137.
138.

Id. at 12.
Id.

139.

AUSTRALIAN TAXATION OFFICE, CHARITY PACK, Apr. 2000, at 20. There is

an income tax exempt charity endorsement form that must be submitted to the A.T.O.
Id. atv. 16.
Id. at 18.
140.
Id.
141.
Id.
142.
Id.
143.
Id.
144.
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environment. 145 Perhaps the lack of heavy income tax regulation can
be rationalized as a credible strategy because the sector is largely
volunteer in Australia.
As Australia's nonprofit sector grows,
developmentally moves ahead, and depends on tax incentives that do
not discourage adventurous acts by nonprofit organizations and their
decision-makers, such an unregulated environment may support, or
at least fail to inhibit, improprieties. This potential result may be
particularly true in the newly created subdivision of the nonprofit
sector, the prescribed private funds. This segment, which is similar
to the U.S. private foundation subdivision of its nonprofit sector, is
truly in its infancy developmentally. To protect nonprofit interests, a
well-considered regulatory federal tax regime may head off potential
improprieties and abuses within this segment. In developing such a
regime, note should be taken of and lessons learned from other
countries' tax regulatory structures. Thus, Part III of this Article
provides an insight into the federal tax regulatory regime of U.S.
private foundations and some of its shortcomings.

III. THE U.S. EXPERIENCE
A. Background-U.S.Nonprofit Sector Today
Today, the U.S. nonprofit sector is a significant economic force
and a major employer; but, perhaps contrary to public perception, it is
not the largest nonprofit sector in the world if the size of the nation's
economy is taken into account. 146 In fact, as a percentage, the
nonprofit sector's contribution to total employment in 1995 in the
United States (7.8%) was only marginally higher than Australia's
(7.2%). 147
Nonprofit sector employees, paid and voluntary,
represented approximately 10.8% of all employees in 1998.148 In that
year, estimates indicate that there were approximately 5.7 million
volunteers measured on a full-time equivalency basis-3.7% of the

145.
While numerous state and federal agencies have a part and share in the
regulation of Australia's nonprofit entities, which results in a fractured regulatory
regime, perhaps the same comment holds true with respect to aspects other than
federal tax regulation of these entities. For a brief discussion of the fractured nature of
the regulatory regime, see supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
146.
S. Wojciech Sokolowski & Lester M. Salamon, The United States, in
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: DIMENSIONS OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 261, 265 (Lester M.

Salamon et al. eds., 1999).
147.
See id. at 266. The Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, and Israel rank higher
than the United States and Australia as providers of employment.
148.
The Nonprofit World: A Statistical Portrait,CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 9,
2001, at 34.
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U.S. workforce-and there were 10.9 million
full-time and part-time
149

paid workers-7.1% of the U.S. workforce.
The number of U.S. nonprofit organizations has steadily
increased over the past two decades. In 1982, nonprofit tax-exempt
organizations numbered 1,180,000.150 By 1998, the United States
15 1
had 1,626,000 nonprofit tax-exempt organizations.
Excluding religious worship groups, a large group within the
U.S. nonprofit sector, the nonprofit sector in the United States had
operating expenditures in 1995 of $502 billion, or 6.9% of the
country's gross domestic product. 152
Although a changing
environment over the years, as of 1997, the nonprofit sector was
composed primarily of health service organizations (53.9%), education
and legal services (18.3%), social and legal services (12%), and
religious organizations (9.7%).
The United States has a strong individualistic culture, which
historically has produced tensions between U.S. individual citizenry
and its governments. This tension can be seen in the U.S. nonprofit
sector, which is perceived to some extent as an alternative to
government as a means of addressing U.S. social and economic
problems. Thus, although some nonprofit organizations receive some
direct governmental funding, in large part, they are financed from
153
fees and charges (56.6%) and philanthropy (12.9%).
In 2000, total charitable giving grew to $203.5 billion, $6.3
billion more than in 1999 after adjusting for inflation. 54 For 2000,
charitable contributions represented two percent of the U.S. gross
domestic product, slightly down from the twenty-eight-year high of

2.1% reached in 1998 and

1999.155

B. U.S. Private Foundations
Like Australia's, the U.S. nonprofit sector dates back to the
country's early history; it was an important caretaker of the welfare

149.
Id.
150.
Id.
151.
Id. This figure represents 5.8% of all United States organizations, and
appears to include tax-exempt organizations in addition to those exempt under I.R.C. §
501(c) and registered with the I.R.S., such as § 527 political organizations and some
churches. In 2000, 1,354,395 § 501(c) organizations were registered with the I.R.S. See
Tax-Exempt Organizations Registered with the IRS, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY Nov. 1,
2001, at 83.
152.
Sokolowski & Salamon, supra note 146, at 262.
153.
Id. at 273. The government provided 30.5% of the funding of nonprofit
organizations in 1995. Id.
154.
Janet L. Fix & Nicole Lewis, Growth in Giving Cools Down, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY, May 31, 2001, at 1.
155.
Press Release, American Association of Fundraising Counsel, Total Giving
Reaches $203.45 Billion as Charitable Contributions Increase 6.6 Percent in 2000 (May
23, 2001), available at http://www.aafrc.org/press3.html.
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of U.S. people. The U.S. nonprofit sector and its institutions made
significant developmental strides in the 1800s and early 1900s. The
late 1800s gave rise to the creation of private foundations in the early
15 7
1900s. 156 By 1910, more than sixty private foundations existed,
amongst which were the Carnegie Institute of Pittsburgh, the
Carnegie Institute for Technology, the Russell Sage Foundation, and
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.15 8 Soon thereafter,
in 1913, John D. Rockefeller, Sr. funded the Rockefeller Foundation
with $100 million.' 5 9 Private foundations have continued to multiply
since that time. The creation of new private foundations in the
United States has exceeded 1,300 in each year since 1968, with more
than three thousand private foundations created in most of those
years and an even larger boom in the two most recent years.' 6 0 Many
of these foundations were created by wealthy individuals whose
16 1
businesses created fortunes for them during the robust economy.
U.S. private foundations numbered 46,832 in 1998, 77,287 in 1999,
and 80,420 in 2000.162
Since their early history, U.S. private foundations have enriched
the nation and the world through charitable endeavors. Early on,
these institutions contributed to "America's distinctive version of the

See Crimm, Private Foundation's Governance, supra note 90 (recounting
156.
the judicial developments that led up to an environment that would support the
creation of private foundations). For a definition of U.S. private foundations, see supra
notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
See Elizabeth T. Boris, Creation and Growth: A Survey of Private
157.
Foundations,in AMERICA'S WEALTHY AND THE FUTURE OF FOUNDATIONS 65, 70 (Teresa

Odendahl ed., 1987) [hereinafter AMERICA'S WEALTHY] (indicating there were 144
foundations in existence before 1910). But see JOHN W. NASON, FOUNDATION
TRUSTEESHIP: SERVICE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 8 (1989) (indicating there were only

sixty-two private foundations formed before 1910). The formation of these early
private foundations took place even before the 1917 enactment of the first U.S.
charitable contribution deduction applicable to individuals.
158. See Crimm, PrivateFoundation'sGovernance, supra note 90 (describing the
early history of private foundations in the United States).
159.
Id.
160. Id. at 1134 n.243 (providing statistics collected on private foundations and
their legal form collected from the Statistics of Income Division of the Internal Revenue
Service).
161.
For example, Bill Gates of Microsoft Corporation created the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, which among its purposes is to finance international vaccination and
children's health programs to fight infectious diseases in Third World countries. Press
Release, World Health Organization, Bill and Melinda Gates and Ted Turner Donate US
$78 Million to Accelerate the Campaign to Eradicate Polio By End of 2000 (Dec. 7, 1999)
Ted Turner, the media
available at http://www.who.int/inf-pr-1999/en/pr99-75.html.
magnate, created the Turner Foundation, which, among its activities, supports
international children's health programs. See http://www.turnerfoundation.org/turner/
popul.html.
FOUNDATIOIN YEARBOOK (2001), THE FOUNDATION CENTER, available at
162.
(reporting for years
http://www.fdncenter.org/fcstats/pdf/02_found-growth/04.pdf
1975-1998); Tax-Exempt Organizations Registered With the IRS, supra note 151
(reporting for the years 1999-2000).

20021

PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS: INSIGHTS FOR AUSTRALIA

781

welfare state. ' 163 Private foundations have enhanced knowledge,
have created opportunities for innovation and experimentation, have
engaged in or led activist causes, and have propelled social change
and many other achievements. Through their varied programs,
grants, and projects, among their many accomplishments, U.S.
private foundations have been instrumental in eradicating diseases,
providing health care to children, educating communities on the
164
value of preventive health services, and reducing world hunger.
They have also combated poverty, 165 supported higher education for
minority groups, 16 6 fought racial inequality, 167 promoted the equality
of women,168 combated juvenile crime, 169 improved the quality of

Teresa Odendahl, Independent Foundations and Wealthy Donors: An
163.
Overview, in AMERICA'S WEALTHY, supra note 157, at 1 (citing Barry D. Karl & Stanley
N. Katz, The American Private PhilanthropicFoundation and the Public Sphere, 18901930, in MINERVA 236, 240 (1981) (stating that private foundations in the early 1900s
are based on "the relation of such organizations [sic] to national government and
politics" and on the "debate over the appropriate role of the federal government in
achieving . . . reforms")). The U.S. welfare state was not based entirely on vast
centralized government bureaucracies, but instead on a government that, after
formulating some national policies, would in some part delegate the implementation of
those federal policies to state and local governments and, through tax incentives, to
private nonprofit organizations. See Peter Dobkin Hall, Resolving the Dilemmas of
Democratic Governance: The HistoricalDevelopment of Trusteeship in America, 16361996, in PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS: NEW SCHOLARSHIP, NEW POSSIBILITIES 3, 31
(Ellen Condliffe Lagemann ed., 1999) [hereinafter PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS].
164.
For example, the Rockwell Fund has dedicated massive amounts of
See
movements.
and
public health
research
resources
to medical
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
http://www.rockfound.org/health.htm.
finances international vaccination and children's health programs to fight infectious
diseases in Third World countries. Press Release, supra note 161. The Turner
See
programs.
children's
health
international
Foundation
supports
The Susan G. Komen Breast
http://www.turnerfoundation.org/turner/popul.html.
Cancer Foundation has fought breast cancer. See http://www.komen.org. The G&P
Charitable Foundation supports the development of effective therapies for cancer
patients. See http://www.gpfoundation.com. The Millbank Memorial Fund and the
Commonwealth Fund have promoted public education about health services. See
Elizabeth Toon, Selling the Public on Public Health, in PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 163, at 119-20.
165. For example, The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation and The Ford Foundation
fight poverty through many programs. See http://www.mott.org/programs/poverty.asp (last
visited Oct. 21, 2001); http://www.fordfound.org.
166.
For example, the Exxon Education Foundation, formed in 1955 supported
higher education for the sake of diversity. See
public
and private
http://www.exxonmobil.com/contributions/education.html. The Slater Fund endowed
education for African-Americans. See seaftl.org/heritage.htm.
167. For example, the Sloan Foundation contributes scholarship funds to enable
African-Americans to enter the professions. See http://www.sloan.org/programs/
eduphd.shtml. The Rockefeller Brother Fund has had a tradition of assisting AfricanAmericans through substantial grants to educational institutions traditionally focused on
African-Americans and to leading African-American organizations such as the National
Urban League. See http://www.rbf.org/nycgrant99.html.
168. For example, to promote the equality of women, the Ford Foundation
supported the Women's Law Fund, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, the
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children's education, 170
17 1
human
promoted
conservation,
173
contemporary arts and culture.
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causes and
environmental
and
supported
rights, 1 72

Through the years, U.S. private foundations have made vast
sums available to financially support these and other charitable
endeavors. Private foundations' grants have increased dramatically

over the past decade. U.S. private foundations' grants amounted to
$8.7 billion a decade ago but rose to an all-time high of $22.8 billion
in 1999.174
Nonetheless, these "providers of good" have not been beyond
reproach and have suffered blows to their halo effect. It has been
popular to attack wealthy individuals as using private foundations to
escape taxation and to set broad, but perhaps unwelcome, agendas for
society.' 7 5 It also has been popular to challenge foundations as
having a disproportionately large impact on the national economy

Women's Rights Project at the Center for Law and Social Policy, and the Center for
Women Policy Studies in their coordinated efforts to compel the government to impose
affirmative action quotas on private employers and to force the government to make
abortions available to all women and supported by tax dollars. WILLIAM H. MCILHANY
II, THE TAX-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS 176 (1980). The Soros Foundations Network has
devoted funds to programs to help women. See http://www.soros.org/womenlindex.htm.
169.
For example, the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation projects have supported
projects to gain employment for youths in inner cities, to address educational problems
of school dropouts, and to reduce juvenile crime. See http://mott.org/programs/p-ss.asp.
The Astor Foundation has focused on New York City's inner city children. See
http://www.astor.org. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Ford Foundation was a
major sponsor of community-based programs to combat juvenile delinquency and
deteriorating "gray areas" of U.S. central cities. Alice O'Connor, The Ford Foundation
and PhilanthropicActivism in the 1960s, in PHILANTHROPIc FOUNDATIONS, supra note
163, at 169.
For example, the AT&T Foundation has a history of supporting education
170.
of children by providing technology and cash grants to schools and by assisting
teachers in the use of technology in class preparation and in the classroom. See
Many other foundations
http://www.att.com/foundation/programs/education.html.
have supported education, including, to name a few, The Ford Foundation, supra note
165, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, http://www.mellon.org/awmpd.html, and the
Charles A. Dana Foundation. See http://www.dana.org/grants/education.
For example, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the Arthur B.
171.
Schultz Foundation, the Heinz Endowment, and the Pew Charitable Trusts devote funds
to environmental programs. See e.g., http://www.heinz.org; http://www.pewtrusts.coml
grants/grantsitem.cfm?image=img3&programarea_id3.
172.
For example, the Ford Foundation promotes rights of migrants, women,
refugees, and minorities. Ford Foundation, supra note 165.
For example, the Soros Foundations Network has supported children's
173.
programs, contemporary arts and cultural programs. Soros Foundation Network,
supra note 168. The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation supports cultural programs
through the nation, as does the Laura Jane Musser Fund. See Mellon Foundation,
supra note 170: see also http://www.musserfund.org.
Fix & Lewis, supra note 154, at 1.
174.
175.
See WALDEMAR A. NIELSEN, THE BIG FOUNDATIONS 5-9 (1972); see infra
notes 202-30 and accompanying text.
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and as building excessive economic and social power. 176 More
substantively, legitimate concerns have concentrated on the
narrowness
of
private
foundations'
management,
the
inappropriateness of certain financial dealings and transactions by
private foundations and their management, and the unsuitability of
certain foundations' activities when they have acted inconsistently
with charitable purposes and with tax advantages enjoyed by the
177
foundations and their donors.
C. U.S. Regulatory Regime and Its Lessons
1. States' Attorneys General
The regulatory regime of the U.S. nonprofit sector is fractured,
largely between states' attorneys general and the I.R.S. 78 Neither
has the core mission of exclusively monitoring and regulating
nonprofit organizations. 1 79 Attorneys general are the states' chief
enforcement officers and are responsible for enforcing state laws on
all individuals and entities within their borders.'8 0
Their
responsibilities are expansive, and, sadly, their workforces are
inadequate to carry out the demands of the office.
The number of staff attorneys available in states' attorneys
general offices to supervise all nonprofit organizations-inclusive of
private foundations-varies. In some states, including those with the
most active offices, the number of staff attorneys has declined over
the years.' 8 ' The most active attorneys general offices have a
separate charitable division manned by several assistant attorneys
general. For example, in 1998, Connecticut had four attorneys
working in the charities division of the attorney general's office;
Massachusetts had six attorneys in its charities division-down from
seven in 1994-and New York had fourteen attorneys in its charities
division-down from seventeen in 1994.182

176.
See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
177.
See infra notes 210-30 and accompanying text.
178.
See generally Nina J. Crimm, Why All Is Not Quiet on the "HomeFront"for
CharitableOrganizations,N.M. L. REV. 1, 6, 24-25 (1999) [hereinafter Why All Is Not
Quiet] (discussing the dual federal-state regulatory system); Crimm, Private
Foundation's Governance, supra note 90, at 1190. In addition, federal and state
agencies may have regulatory authority over such nonprofit entities as health care
organizations.
179.
See id.
180.
Id.
181.
See infra notes 182-84, 189 and accompanying text.
182.
See Thomas J. Billitteri, Rethinking Who Can Sue A Charity, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 12, 1998, at 35 (providing a table of the number of staff lawyers
in states' attorney generals offices as determined by the National Association of
Attorneys General); HARRIET BOGRAD, THE ROLE OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 9
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Other states, such as Georgia, Hawaii, North Dakota, Rhode
Island, and South Carolina, however, had one assistant attorney
general to supervise the nonprofit sector as only a portion of his or
her responsibilities.18 3 In 1998, some states, such as Alabama,
Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, Nevada, New
Mexico, Tennessee, Virginia, and the District of Columbia, did not
18 4
have any attorneys dedicated solely to charitable matters.
In 1994, New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts charities
divisions reported that their states' registration and reporting
systems imposed on charities, although useful, were not the source of
most of their investigations.18 5 Rather, inquiries or complaints from
dissenting board members, employees, beneficiaries, or the public,
including the media, were more likely to trigger investigations.18 6 In
determining which cases to pursue, the attorneys general were
reported to consider the amount involved, the size of the organization,
the impact on the public, and the seriousness or extremity of the
abusive conduct, with the worst improprieties-including fiduciary
In New York,
breaches and tax abuses-receiving attention.'8 7
Connecticut, and Massachusetts, the attorneys general suggested
that only a small fraction of inquiries concerning charities in their
states could be investigated.' 88 Personnel constraints, the stress of
"more important" duties, and the lack of sufficient information to
warrant an investigation could partially account for the limited
89
investigations.1
Moreover, it appears that political pressures or priorities may
cause governmental authorities to shun aggressive pursuit or even to
close their eyes to the most egregious and repetitive abuses involving

(Yale Univ. Program on Non-Profit Organizations, Working Paper No. 206, Aug. 1994)
(indicating that in 1994, the state attorneys general offices in Connecticut had four
attorneys, in Massachusetts had seven attorneys, and in New York had seventeen
attorneys).
183.
See Billitteri, supra note 182, at 35; Number ofFull-Time Equivalent (FTE)
Attorney Positions by Selected Practice Areas: "Public Protection" (Nat'l Ass'n of
Attorneys General), 1997, at 18, 20.
184.
See Billitteri, supra note 182, at 35 (table showing additional states in 1998
without attorneys to monitor charities to include Alaska, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wyoming); BOGRAD, supra note 182, at 12.
185.
BOGRAD, supra note 182, at 12.
186.
Id. at 11-13. The attorneys noted that media involvement, while not
determinative in a decision about whether to devote staff time to a case, does add
pressure. Id. at 16.
Id. at 15-16 (citing Pamela Mann, the attorney in charge of the New York
187.
charities office, as stating that the focus there is to "get the bad guys"). Moreover,
there was some sentiment expressed that the attorney general should not be the
watchdog for the nonprofit sector. Id. at 5.
188.
Id. at 14-16.
189.
Crimm, Why All Is Not Quiet, supra note 178, at 24-25.
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private foundations. 190 Attorneys general are political officers. Some
are elected' 91 and some are political appointees. 19 2 Once elected or
appointed, attorneys general may set enforcement agendas as a result
of powerful politicians and influential citizens. It has been suggested
that state attorneys general avoid investigations of nonprofit
organizations generally, and not merely of private foundations.
Several reasons can be suggested: if investigations were undertaken,
the attorneys general would make powerful enemies; if punishments
followed, attorneys general would make vindictive enemies of the
richest and most influential people and organizations in the state;
and if attorneys general were successful in ending abuses, the "wells
of charity" would dry up, and it would be the attorneys general who
193
might suffer politically.
2. Internal Revenue Service
Congress has vested authority in the U.S. Department of
Treasury to monitor and enforce federal tax statutes. The I.R.S., as a
division of the Department of Treasury, therefore functions primarily
as a collector of revenues, but it also is responsible for monitoring
taxpayers and nonprofit organizations to ensure compliance with the
federal tax laws. Nonetheless, Professor Henry Hansmann, a scholar
who has provided valuable insights on the U.S. nonprofit sector for
years, has argued that the I.R.S. "has at best only an indirect interest
in policing the fiduciary behavior in nonprofits."'194 He has argued

190.
Id. at 25.
191.
The attorneys general of most states are elected. New York and Arizona
are but two examples of states in which voters elect the attorney general. By
comparison, the attorney general of Maine is determined by joint ballot of a convention
of State Senators and Representatives. ME. CONST. art. IX, §11.
192.
For states in which the attorney general is appointed, the appointment may
be by the governor or by the Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court. For example,
the attorneys general of Alaska, Georgia, and Wyoming are appointed by the governor.
See Alaska Department of Law, Attorney General Bruce M. Botellio, available at
http://www.law.state.ak.us/ag/index.html; Office of the Attorney General of Georgia,
History of the Office, at http://www.state.ga.us/ago/history.html; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 91-601 (Michie 1977). The attorneys general of each New Jersey and Hawaii are
appointed by the governor and confirmed by the state Senate. See N.J. Department of
Law & Public Safety, Attorney General John J. Farmer, Jr., available at
http://www.state.nj/uslps; State of Hawaii Department of the Attorney General,
available at http://www.state.hi.us/ag. The Attorney General of Tennessee is appointed
by the Chief Justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court. See TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 5.
193.
HOWARD L. OLECK, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND
ASSOCIATIONS 233 (5th ed., 1998).
194.
Hansmann, supra note 1, at 604 (suggesting that policing and enforcement
of the nondistribution constraint-the constraint against distribution of assets of
§ 501(c)(3) organizations to persons other than the intended beneficiaries-is not
central to the collection of revenues, which is the main objective of the I.R.S., and
therefore burdens, confuses, and threatens the I.R.S. mission).
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that because the I.R.S.'s main attention must be dedicated to tax
collection, it is only indirectly interested in the fiduciary behavior of
nonprofit organizations and their decision-makers.
3. The Development of U.S. Federal Tax Regulatory Regime
The federal tax regulation of its private foundations is steeped in
political pressures and reactive legislative measures. Politicians and
government officials have been parties to assaults on private
foundations and to proffered controls and remedies for perceived and
actual wrongdoing by private foundations, their creators, and
195
decision-makers.
The distrust of private foundations and their funders has been
evident since the initial development of private foundations in the
United States. 196 As early as 1913, President William Howard Taft,
established the Commission on Industrial Relations, chaired by
Frank P. Walsh, which conducted hearings from 1913 to 1915 on a
broad range of issues involving private foundations, among which
was the concentration of wealth and influence. In 1916, the Walsh
Commission published its final report strongly critical of private
foundations. The Walsh Commission accused large foundations of
being instruments of wealthy industrialists and robber barons who
desired to avoid taxes, to redistribute their "tainted" money to elite
institutions that would produce new elite individuals, and to use their
funds to influence policy decisions and choices that would strongly
impact, if not control, U.S. citizens' social and educational lives. 197 A
majority of the Walsh Commission recommended the censure of
private foundations. The Commission's report proposed restrictions
on the size, functions, powers, and lives of foundations, and proposed
limitations on the accumulation of unexpended income of private
foundations. 198 The report further suggested strict scrutiny of

195.
See Crimm, Private Foundation'sGovernance, supra note 90, at 1097.
196.
During the 1912 presidential race, candidates Theodore Roosevelt and
When Mr.
William Howard Taft had opposed federal charters for foundations.

Rockerfeller applied for a Federal Charter for his General Education Board, Mr.
Roosevelt claimed that "no amount of charity in spending such fortunes can
compensate in any way for the misconduct of acquiring them." Mr. Taft suggested that
the charter would amount to "a bill to incorporate Mr. Rockefeller." PETER DOBKIN
HALL, INVENTING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, 47-48 (1992) (citing PETER COLLIER &
DAVID HOROWITz, THE ROCKEFELLERS: AN AMERICAN DYNASTY 63-64 (1976)).

197.
Private foundations were considered ready vehicles for channeling large
amounts of money to influence public policy. Although many of the private foundations
did not attempt to influence public policy directly, a few, such as the Russell Sage
Foundation and the Brookings Institute directly addressed public policy matters. See
HALL, supra note 196, at 48.
198.
STAFF OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 64TH CONG.,
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: FINAL REPORT AND TESTIMONY SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS
(1916).
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foundations' investments and open reports to government officials. 199
Congress did not take steps at that time to implement the Walsh
Commission's proposals or recommendations.
Private foundations in the 1940s greatly increased in number

and diversified their activities. 200 They thus became a more visible
part of the United States. This visibility, supported by evidence
collected by the Treasury Department from private foundations'
annual informational tax returns, which had been required since
1943,201 triggered Congressional concern about foundations' incomegenerating activities unrelated to their charitable purposes. Aware
that private foundations had been used for private gains, that they
had engaged in income-producing activities unrelated to their
charitable purposes, that some had accumulated large amounts of
income and failed to distribute it, that foundations were being used as
a tool to maintain control of family businesses and to protect funds
from taxation, and that a judicial conflict existed over whether
foundations' unrelated business activities were inconsistent with
their tax-exemptions, Congress enacted new tax laws as part of the
Revenue Act of 1950.202 These new federal tax laws did not
separately define private foundations, but they reflected the
Congressional aim to target foundations for regulation. 20 3 One new
tax provision imposed statutory arms-length standards on
transactions
between
non-publicly
supported
tax-exempt

199. Id.
200.
See Crimm, Private Foundation'sGovernance, supra note 90, at 1108.
201.
See H.R. REP. No. 78-871 to accompany H.R. 3687, 78th Cong. (1st Sess.
1943), at 24-25. The Revenue Act of 1943 required private foundations to disclose gross
income, receipts and disbursements on their annual returns. Id. Although private
foundations were not separately defined, the Revenue Act of 1943 exempted from the
disclosure requirement religious organizations, schools, certain fraternal groups,
publicly supported charities, and certain government corporations. Id. Although no
explanation was given as to the reason for differentiating these nonprofit organizations
from private foundations, the information gathered from the disclosures would supply
Congress with ample information to determine the need for further regulation. See id.
202.
Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, 64 Stat. 947 (1950) (enacting
I.R.C. §§ 502, 503, 504, 511-514, re-enacted as part of the I.R.C. of 1954).
203.
Congress excluded some tax-exempt organizations from the new regulatory
provisions of the Revenue Act of 1950. The Senate Finance Committee report
explained:
The organizations [religious organizations, schools, publicly-supported
organizations, governmentally supported organizations, and medical
organizations, including hospitals] excluded from the application of these
provisions are in general what might be called "public" organizations and
because of this characteristic are not believed likely to become involved in any
of the prohibited transactions.
SENATE FINANCE COMM. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., at 38 (1952). See JOHN A.
EDIE, CONGRESS AND PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 5 (1987)

(commenting that "through a process of elimination, private foundations were being
targeted even through they were still undefined by the Code.").
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organizations and their substantial donors or related persons where
the transactions otherwise might result in self-dealing and private
gains to the donors or related persons. 20 4 The Revenue Act of 1950

also established rules to control accumulated investments and
financial transactions unrelated to charitable functions and to curtail
20 5
tax-exempt organizations' unrelated income -generating activities.
During the McCarthy hysteria of the 1950s, private foundations
and their donors were targeted. Several Congressional commissions
and committees were convened over the course of those years and the
1960s. 20 6 In the early 1960s, the U.S. Department of Treasury
undertook a study of private philanthropy and private foundations.
The study resulted in a report to Congress in 1965.207 While the 1965

204.
Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, supra note 202. Although the
House of Representatives passed a provision absolutely prohibiting self-dealing, the
Senate rejected the proposed statute as too strict. See EDIE, supra note 203.
205.
Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, supra note 202.
The first Commission was the Cox Commission, authorized on April 4,
206.
1952, by Congress to engage in a "full and complete investigation and study of
educational and philanthropic foundations and other comparable organizations which
are exempt from Federal income taxation to determine which such foundations and
organizations are using their resources for purposes other than ... for which they were
established, and especially to determine which . . . are using their resources for unHearings before the House, Select Comm. to
American and subversive activities ....
Investigate Tax-Exempt Found. and Comparable Org., 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1953).
Thereafter, in April 1954, Congress authorized a Special Committee to Investigate
Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations. EDIE, supra note 203. The
Reece Committee investigated and held hearings during 1954 that focused on motives
for creating foundations and their influences on public life. Id. More specifically, the
Reece Committee inquired into the use of foundations as vehicles for tax avoidance and
the control of wealth, their influence on the social sciences, their power to influence
public policy and opinion by selective sponsorship of academic research, their failures
and inadequacies in their fiduciary responsibilities, their managers' increasing power,
their influence on the media, their promotion of internationalism in foreign policy, and
their roles in subversive activities. Id.
In 1962, Congressman Wright Patman initiated a study of private foundations and
between 1962 and 1972 reported his findings to Congress in eight installments. Id. He
legitimately concluded that some private foundations were being utilized in selfdealing transactions to the advantage of their donors and related persons, that some
foundations sheltered from taxation the wealthy individuals' appreciating assets
accumulated from their businesses, that some private foundations were involved in
unrelated business activities that disadvantaged for-profit competitors, and that IRS
was lax in its oversight. Id.
For a more detailed discussion of these commissions and committees, see Crimm,
Private Foundation'sGovernance, supra note 90, at 1110-14.
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 89TH CONG., TREASURY
207.
DEPT. REPORT ON PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS (lst Sess., Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter
TREASURY DEPT. REP. ON PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS]. The Treasury Department had
based its report on a survey of approximately 1,300 private foundations, which
included one hundred percent of all foundations with assets of at least ten million
dollars, twenty-five percent of all foundations having one million dollars to ten million
dollars in assets, ten percent of those with assets of $100,000 to one million dollars,
and five percent of all foundations with assets of $100,000 or less. For purposes of the
survey, private foundations were defined as every I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) nonprofit
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Treasury report highlighted in positive terms the vital role of private
foundations to the nation, it also presented some disturbing
information that identified financial abuses spreading among
foundations. 20 8 The Treasury report delineated private foundation
problems and attributed many of the problems to the intimate
structural ties between the private foundations, their donors, donor
families, and affiliated for-profit corporations. 20 9 Six major problem
areas were identified: (1) self-dealing, (2) delay in transfer of benefits
to society, (3) foundation involvement in business, (4) family use of
foundations to control corporate and other property, (5) financial
transactions unrelated to charitable functions, and (6) the lack of
breadth of foundation management. 2 10 The report recommended that
Congress consider enacting new statutes to prohibit all acts of selfdealing, to forbid foundations to borrow funds for investments, to
limit foundations' investments to safe instruments, to limit private
foundation ownership of businesses to twenty percent, to pay out net
income to active charitable operations on a current basis, to limit
donor influence over a foundation to twenty-five years, and to repeal
the charitable donation deduction for transfers of interests in family
corporations until the foundation disposes of the interest or devotes it
to charitable purposes. 211 Between 1966 and 1968, Treasury released
three more reports, and allegations of foundation misconduct
212
continued.
In 1969, the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (TRA of
1969),213 although not altering the underlying laws that permitted

charitable organization except publicly supported organizations, churches and
conventions and associations of churches, schools, and organizations that test for public
safety. See EDIE, supra note 203, at 10.
TREASURY DEPT. REP. ON PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS, supra note 207, at 5.
208.
209.
210.

See WALDEMAR A. NIELSON, THE BIG FOUNDATIONS 8 (1972).
TREASURY DEPT. REP. ON PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS, supra note 207, at 6-8.

211.
212.

Id.
The Treasury Department reports were planned as a means of pressuring

Congress to enact reforms. See JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 174-75 (1985).

Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969). Prior to enactment, the Peterson
213.
Commission studied roles of foundations and American philanthropy, commented on
prevalent abuses by private foundations, and recommended governmental regulation
rather than voluntary self-regulation by the foundations in areas in which private
foundations previously had been found to have abused their tax-exempt status.
FOUNDATIONS, PRIVATE GIVING, AND PUBLIC POLICY: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE COMMISSION ON FOUNDATIONS AND PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY (1970) [hereinafter

PETERSON COMM. REPORT]. The report suggested that the concentration of foundation
assets had resulted generally in diminished income for charity, in large part as a result
of foundations' poor investment performances. Id. at 13, 78-79. The report found that
a minority of private foundations owned a controlling interest in a business corporation
and that there was no evidence to support claims of wide-spread financial abuses and
self-dealing. See EDIE, supra note 203, at 13. Noting the lack of available data and
information about private foundations, the report encouraged foundations to fully and
regularly report on their activities to disabuse the public of misconceptions about
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the abuses, 2 14 constructed a sweeping and comprehensive "band-aid"
regulatory scheme applicable to private foundations that was
intended to rein in financial and other abuses. First, the TRA of 1969
statutorily distinguished private foundations from public charities by
It required private
providing a definition of the former. 215
foundations to include in their governing instruments provisions that
would provide that their acts and transactions and those of their
managers and other integral persons would not violate the prohibited
activities, transaction, and investment rules of concurrently enacted
I.R.C. §§ 4940 through 4945.216 The TRA of 1969 authorized the
I.R.S. to impose excise taxes on prohibited activities-such as selfdealing, lobbying, electioneering, grassroots campaigning-and on
2 17
certain investments of private foundations.
Many of these, excise taxes were two-tiered-the first tier
imposed on the problematic transaction and the second tier imposed
if the transaction was not corrected. Depending upon the particular
type of transaction, the statutes permitted the I.R.S. to impose the
excise taxes on a wrongdoer, a complicit foundation manager, or the
foundation. For example, the TRA of 1969 imposed a two-tier tax on
all self-dealing transactions, effectively prohibiting any self-dealing,
even arms-length transactions, between a private foundation and
2 18
It
persons with an interest or with control over the foundation.
also established minimum income distribution requirements for all
private nonoperating foundations. 219 The primary purpose of this
provision was to encourage private foundations to make appropriate
grants consistent with their obligations to the public.
Aiming to ensure that private foundations were not merely alter
egos of businesses and their controlling shareholders, the TRA of
1969 established rules for private foundations' divestiture of excess

private foundations' activities and their "monolithic sameness." PETERSON COMM.
REPORT, supra, at 47. Although the final Peterson Commission report was published
in 1970, after passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the Commission contributed to
the 1969 legislative deliberations by delivering its findings and recommendations to
Congress. For a fuller discussion, see Crimm, PrivateFoundation's Governance, supra
note 90, at 1118.
Under Wilbur Mills, the House Ways and Means Committee held hearings
beginning February 1969. The hearings culminated in the enactment of the TRA of
1969.
214.
See WITTE, supra note 212, at 175.
215.
I.R.C. § 509(a) (1988) added by Pub. L. No. 91-273, § 101(a), 84 Stat. 300
(1969).
216.
I.R.C. § 508(e) (1988).
217.
I.R.C. §§ 4940-46 (2000).
218.
I.R.C. § 4941.
219.
I.R.C. § 4942. Operating foundations were excluded from the provision
because they are created and operated to substantially fund their own charitable
activities and not to act as grant-making institutions.
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Absent divestiture within
holdings in business enterprises. 220
§ 4943 subjected a private
I.R.C.
statutorily established time frames,
foundation to an excise tax on excess business holdings in
businesses. 22 1 To ensure conservative investment strategies and to
minimize speculation by private foundations with respect to their
assets, Congress enacted restrictions that effectively impose a
prudent trustee investment standard on private foundations and
their managers. 222 With the addition of I.R.C. § 4944, breaches of the
duty to invest so as not to jeopardize private foundations' abilities to
carry out their exempt purposes became punishable by the imposition
223
of a two-tier excise tax.
Congress confirmed its proscription against substantial lobbying
activities and all campaign activities by all § 501(c)(3) organizations,
commenting with reference to the ban on campaign activities that "no
degree of support for an individual's candidacy for public office" is
permitted. 224 Additionally, Congress directed a special provision at
private foundations. Pursuant to I.R.C. § 4945, the I.R.S. can impose
an excise tax on any amount paid or cost incurred by private
foundations to carry on propaganda or to otherwise attempt to
influence legislation or to influence the outcome of any specific public
election, or to directly or indirectly carry on a voter registration drive
unless certain conditions are satisfied. 225 One effect of this provision
was to annul the substantiality rule contained in § 501(c)(3) for
purposes of applying the excise tax on the costs incurred by private
foundations in engaging in such lobbying activities. 226 Moreover,
I.R.C. § 4945 imposes an excise tax on costs incurred to influence the
outcome of any specific public election. 227 This provision appears to
have provided an "intermediate sanction" for such campaign activity
by private foundations, which § 501(c)(3) purportedly bans entirely
for determining whether an organization deserves tax-exempt status.
The TRA of 1969 also imposed restrictions on unorthodox or
nontraditional grants, thereby having the potential to effectively
paralyze significant innovation and to inhibit progress in dealing with
such controversial problems as the urban crisis and race relations. 228
It required private foundations to file and publicly disclose not only
annual information tax returns but also, if assets exceeded five
thousand dollars, annual reports listing assets at book and market

220.
I.R.C. § 4943.
221.
Id.
I.R.C. § 4944.
222.
Id.
223.
224.
H.R. REP. No. 413, § 32 (1969); S. REP. No. 552, § 47 (1969).
I.R.C. § 4945(d)(1)-(2), (e).
225.
Nonetheless, the substantiality rule governs with respect to a private
226.
foundation's deservedness of tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3).
I.R.C. § 4945(a), (d)(2).
227.
See NIELSON, supra note 209, at 18-19.
228.
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value, and listing grantees, grants, and purposes, and foundation
managers who were substantial contributors. 229 These newly enacted
provisions represented dramatic regulatory strictures on a segment of
the nonprofit sector that until this time had been largely self230
regulating.
Studies, commissions, and congressional hearings on private
foundations have continued periodically since 1969. Some of these
have led to limited, rather than comprehensive, modifications to the
statutory scheme of the TRA of 1969. For example, in response to the
1975 report of the Filer Commission on Private Philanthropy and
Public Needs, 231 in which a number of legislative recommendations
were presented, in 1976 Congress refined the rules against selfdealing enacted by the TRA of 1969.232 As liberalized, the rules
permitted a private foundation to sell certain property to "disqualified
persons" to whom the property had been leased and to sell certain
''non-excess" business holdings to "disqualified persons." Other
relatively minor liberalizing modifications were made to several
excise tax rules. 23 3 Among those changes, Congress reduced the
minimum payout rules applicable to private foundations. 234 Congress

229.
I.R.C. § 6104(d), 83 Stat. 523-24. See EDIE, supra note 203, at 13.
230.
As a means of paying for the monitoring function intended of the I.R.S.,
Congress imposed a four percent tax on net investment income of private foundations.
I.R.C. § 4940 (note of decision).
231.
The Commission was chaired by John H. Filer. The Commission made a
comprehensive multidisciplinary survey of charitable tax-exempt organizations as
employers, as political forces and as sources of varied services. The report considered
the tax issues and regulations affecting charitable tax-exempt organizations. It
considered charitable organizations to be an organized and unified "voluntary" sector
in the United States and recommended the establishment of a permanent quasigovernmental agency to represent it. The Department of Treasury published the Filer
Commission's research papers in six volumes in 1977. See HALL, supra note 196, at 78.
Eventually, the diverse interests of the voluntary or independent sector were
represented by the Independent Sector, an organization formed to be a common
meeting ground for nonprofit organizations. Id. at 79.
232.
EDIE, supra note 203, at 23 (describing the refinement of the self-dealing
rules as "minor").
233.
For example, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 permitted certain "set asides" to
be treated as qualifying distributions for purposes of I.R.C. § 4942(g)(2). Pub. L. No.
94-455, § 1302(a), 90 Stat. 1713-14 (1976).
234. . Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 1303, 1310, 90 Stat. 1715, 1729 (1976). The modified
rule eliminated the fluctuating percentage payout based on a statutory formula with
its highest payout rate of 6.75%, and it substituted a payout requirement of the greater
of all adjusted net income or five percent of net assets. Id.
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made further minor revisions to the 1969 tax statutes in 1978.235
Other minor changes were made in 1980 and 1981.236

Under the guiding hand of Representative Rostenkowski (DIllinois), Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee,
Congress again left intact most of the TRA of 1969 provisions
affecting private foundations when it enacted the Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984 (DRA of 1984).237 Importantly, however, the DRA of 1984
made a number of changes that would favorably impact
foundations. 23 8
Provisions reduced the differing treatment of
charitable deductions for inter vivos gifts to private foundations and
public charities. As a result of the charitable deduction changes,
living donors could now deduct up to thirty percent-formerly twenty
percent-of their contribution base-similar to adjusted gross
income-or cash gifts to private foundations as contrasted to a
deduction of up to fifty percent for contributions to public charities
and operating foundations. 23 9 Moreover, gifts to private nonoperating
foundations exceeding the allowable deduction for the taxable year
could now be carried forward for five years,2 40 a privilege previously
permitted only for contributions to public charities and operating
foundations. Gifts of limited amounts of publicly traded stock could
24 1
now be deducted based on full fair market value instead of cost.
The DRA of 1984 liberalized the definitions of "disqualified person"
and "substantial contributor" for purposes of the private foundation
excise taxes; 242 authorized the I.R.S. to abate first-tier excise taxes,

235.
Among the modifications enacted as part of the Revenue Act of 1978, the
I.R.C. § 4940 excise tax on investment income was reduced from four percent to two
percent. Pub. L. No. 95-600, §520(a), 92 Stat. 2884 (1978). The reduction responded to
the fact that the collections of the excise tax had exceeded the costs of I.R.S.
enforcement efforts.
236.
For instance, one change modified the I.R.C. § 4942 distribution
requirements imposed on private foundations. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 823(a), 95 Stat.
351-52 (1981). Additionally the charitable contribution deduction was changed to
permit deductions by individuals who did not itemize deductions and to allow
corporations to increase contributions from five percent of net income to ten percent of
net income. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 263(a), 95 Stat. 264 (1981).
237.
Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
238.
One such provision reduced the I.R.C. § 4940 excise tax on net investment
income from two percent to one percent for private foundations able to demonstrate a
five year average percentage payout and the use of the one percent savings for
additional qualifying distributions. Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 302-303, 98 Stat. 779-82
(1984).
239.
I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A), (B), (E), added by Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 492, 98 Stat.
853-54 (1984). In contrast to the fifty percent cap on deductions to public charities, the
lower cap on deductions to private foundations perhaps embodies the sense that
donations to private foundations reflect a donor's more personal goals rather than the
broader public goals that a donation to a public charity would support.
240.
I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C)(ii), 98 Stat. 853-54 (1984).
241.
I.R.C. § 170(e)(5), 98 Stat. 778 (1984). Gifts to private foundations of other
appreciated properties were valued at cost, plus sixty percent.
242.
Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 306(a), 98 Stat. 784 (1984).
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other than for self-dealing, if violations were due to reasonable cause
243
and were corrected and applied to certain stock transactions;
increased the minimum required payout, generally five percent of
investment assets, by recapture of prior qualifying distributions and
permitted grant administration expenses to be counted as qualified
distributions; 244 extended the excess business holding divestiture
period in certain circumstances; 245 and, under defined conditions,
enabled substantial contributors to cast off the taint associated with
246
that status.
Most recently, as a result of the Tax and Trade Agreement
Extension Act of 1998, private foundations became obligated to
provide wider and timely access to annual information tax returns,
which the I.R.S. has interpreted to require their public availability
through disclosure within thirty days upon individual request or by
the foundation posting them on the Internet. 247 The federal
government's and citizens' interests in oversight of private
foundations and in their public accountability had prompted the

Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 312, 98 Stat. 786 (1984).
243.
Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 304, 98 Stat. 782-83 (1984).
244.
245.
Pub. L. No. 98.369, §§ 307-310, 98 Stat. 784-86 (1984).
See EDIE, supra note 203, at 27, 63.
246.
247.
I.R.C. § 6104(d). The Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172,
§ 101(e)(3), 83 Stat. 487 (1969) added I.R.C. § 6104(d) to provide that private
foundations must make available for inspection at their principal offices annual
reports. In 1980, Congress amended I.R.C. § 6104(d) to instead require that public
foundations make available for inspection at their principal offices their annual
information tax returns. Pub. L. No. 96-603, § l(b), 94 Stat. 3503 (1980). More
recently, as a result of the Tax and Trade Relief Extension Act of 1998, I.R.C. § 6104(d)
was amended to provide wider access to annual information tax returns of private
foundations. The 1998 Act deleted the former requirement that private foundations
place a notice in a newspaper having general circulation in the county of its principal
office to inform the public of the availability of its annual information return. Pub. L.
No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-1, 2681-890 (1998). Final Treasury regulations, adopted
January 13, 2000, and effective on March 13, 2000, now provide that private
foundations must make available their Forms 1023-application for § 501(c)(3) taxexempt status--along with the I.R.S. determination letter pursuant to l.R.C. § 6110and Forms 990-PF-annual information tax return. The private foundation must
make these documents available for inspection and photocopying upon request, either
made in writing or in person, or alternatively, these documents are deemed to be
available for inspection if "widely available" by posting on the Internet through the
foundation's own web page or as part of a data base of similar documents established
by another organization. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6104(d)-4(a) (2002). Failure to comply
with the request can subject the private foundation's responsible party-the person
failing to provide the documents-to penalties under § 6652(c)(1)(C) and (D), and if the
failure to permit public inspection is willful, an additional penalty is permitted under §
6685. The party requesting documents from a tax-exempt organization does not have
standing to bring an action against the organization to enforce compliance with these §
6104 disclosure rules; only the IRS has standing to bring such an action.
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D. Shortcomings of Federal Tax Regulatory Regime
Over the course of the last ninety years, Congress periodically
and dramatically converted the self-regulatory environment of
private foundations to one that increasingly became regulated by
federal tax statutes. Even with the heightened and strengthened tax
regulatory scheme, however, scandals and abuses involving U.S.
In large part, private
private foundations have persisted.2 49
foundations' intimate and private funding, governance, and
management structures are to blame. Serious attention to formal
protocols often is lacking, and sight is lost of the foundations' legal
and moral obligations to benefit the public. The blame, however, also
must be attributed to an under-regulated and permissive
environment. Current federal tax laws, as well as monitoring and
enforcement activities by the I.R.S., the responsible federal
administrative agency, have been inadequate to completely deter
abusive behaviors.
The special federal tax rules of I.R.C. §§ 4940 through 4945
applicable to private foundations and the statutes' excise tax
structures are intended to curb abuses engendered by the intimate
private foundation structure. Under these rules, explicit and implicit
fiduciary duties are imposed on persons, such as substantial
contributors, directors, trustees, officers, and other insiders who are
supposed to act exclusively on behalf of a private foundation. Yet, the
statutes are deficient in their deterrent effect on abusive behaviors.
The deficiency has many possible causes. First, wrongdoers may
escape the excise taxes because actual breaches of fiduciary
responsibilities are difficult to detect and identify. Deliberations and
discussions by foundations' governing boards are private and often
even exclude foundation staff members. Individual wrongdoing may
not be disclosed either within or outside the boardroom. Second,
wrongdoers who are risk-takers may not be deterred from abusive
behaviors by threat of pecuniary punishment, especially when the
potential for being caught is relatively slim. Also, the statutes
exclude from punishment managers who do not have actual
knowledge that a particular behavior, transaction, or act may violate

248.

See JOINT COMM. REP., 105TH CONG., 2nd Sess., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF

TAx LEGISLATION (1998).
249.
See, e.g., Janet L. Fix, Wallace-Reader's Digest Funds and N.Y Attorney
General Reach Settlement, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, May 17, 2001, at 13; Ralph
Blumenthal, 13 Institutions Obtain Control of Vast Bequest, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2001,
at AI; Crimm, PrivateFoundation'sGovernance, supra note 90.
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or violates a statute. 250 This structure unto itself provides no
incentive for managers to be informed, and additionally, the nature of
the statutory remedies-solely after-the-fact pecuniary tax
remedies-likely do not encourage
managers to become
knowledgeable.
Finally, historically, these laws and remedies
25 1
purportedly have been leniently enforced by the I.R.S.
Enforcement leniency or failures by the I.R.S. are enabling, not
inhibiting, to individuals, especially to risk-takers.
Although, pursuant to I.R.C. § 6104, private foundations are
required to file an annual informational income tax return, Form 990PF, this return was not initially intended as a public accountability
tool. It is all too easy for responses to be crafted so as not to raise
probing questions by the I.R.S., by state authorities who also may
have access to the form, or by the public who can obtain access to the
form. 252 The response format and the data and other information
required for completion of a Form 990-PF neither engender adequate
transparency nor reflect a sufficiently high standard of
253
accountability.
The I.R.S.'s inadequate budget and its indirect interest in the
fiduciary behavior of nonprofit organizations and their d ecisionmakers are weaknesses of the U.S. tax regulatory regime. Larger
budgets over the years permitting more audits of nonprofit
organizations, including private foundations, could potentially have
deterred some of the abuses encountered along the way. The absence
2 54
of a federal agency, separate and independent from the I.R.S.,
whose core mission and responsibilities are the regulation of the
nonprofit sector, perhaps has contributed to weaknesses in the
federal tax regulatory regime.255

250.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 4941(a)(1)-(2).
251.
Current state laws, that authorize the state attorney general to pursue
fiduciaries who breach their duties to nonprofit organizations, even if viewed as
regulatory tools to complement existing federal tax statutes, do not appear to be
adequate roadblocks to abusive behavior.
See Crimm, Private Foundation's
Governance, supra note 90, at 1184-86; Crimm, Why All Is Not Quiet, supra note 178,
at 6, 25.
252.
See Peter Swords, Address at Norman A. Sugarman Lecture, entitled
Nonprofit Accountability: The Sector's Response to Government Regulation, (Mar. 6
1999), available at http://www.qual990.org/np-account.html (stating that although the
Form 990 is a public report that now provides for disclosure of insiders' abusive
transactions, "[t]hose who are cagey enough to figure out how to bilk their nonprofit
organizations are cagey enough to see to it that their malefaction is not disclosed on
their nonprofit's 990s.").
253.
For a fuller discussion on possible means of strengthening, see Crimm,
Private Foundation'sGovernance, supra note 90, at 1188-90.
254.
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
255.
For a fuller discussion of the potential responsibilities and structure of such
an independent federal agency, see Crimm, Private Foundation's Governance, supra
note 90, at 1192-94.
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These various shortcomings have been augmented by other
structures and factors. For example, regulatory responsibility for
nonprofit organizations is fractured between the federal and state
governments. 256 Private foundations can be created and maintained
without independent boards of directors or trustees, thereby
increasing their insularity and privacy and providing opportunities
for potential abuses. 257 To date, Congress has not chosen to address
or remedy these weaknesses.

IV. INSIGHTS FOR AUSTRALIA'S KEY DECISION-MAKERS

If philanthropy is to be encouraged by taxation incentives and
deductions, the tax base must be protected from aggressive and
unwarranted tax avoidance and evasion. Apart from well-drafted
laws, whether in the United States or in Australia, an appropriate
regulatory strategy is essential for protection of the tax base.
A. Effective Regulators
The strategy requires that for taxation authorities to be effective
regulators of the nonprofit sector, they must have adequate financial
and workforce resources and must be delegated appropriate powers
both to prevent improprieties that lead to tax avoidance and evasion
and to monitor for abuses. Among the delegated powers that the
taxation authorities should exercise are roles in educating the public,
educating the nonprofit sector, and accessing information to detect
improprieties. The taxation authorities then must utilize the law and
their administrative tools to recover tax revenues through
administrative fines, settlements, and litigation penalties.
B. Remedying Major Improprieties
Some U.S. private foundations have experienced credibility
crises, if not peril to their existence, 258 as a result of their decisionmakers' breaches of fiduciary duties, self-dealing activities,
investment and tax avoidance tactics, intimate management
structures, and their accountability failures. Finding a means of

256.
For a fuller discussion, see Crimm, PrivateFoundation'sGovernance, supra
note 90, at 1184-86, 1190-91 (discussing the roles of state attorneys general and the
I.R.S. and their failures to cooperate); Crimm, Why All Is Not Quiet, supra note 178, at
26-28 (discussing the distrust of the I.R.S.).
257.
For a discussion of the benefit of an governing board composed of
independent persons, see Crimm, Private Foundation's Govenrance, supra note 90, at
1195.
258.
See supra note 4-5 and accompanying text.
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remedying the major improprieties has been and continues to be no
small task. Aside from having effective laws and effective regulators,
other mechanisms and vehicles are crucial for an effective regulatory
regime.
First, the appropriate persuasive moral climate must exist to
influence tax behavior. The moral climate and culture must clearly
and publicly label tax and fiduciary improprieties as "anti-social" and
must vigorously encourage professional advisors that aggressive and
enterprising tax planning through the use of black letter law
loopholes is not within the spirit of tax concessions, such as the
charitable contribution deduction.
Second, it is imperative that private foundations' staffs and
governing board members, such as trustees, be informed of their
fiduciary and governance responsibilities.
A major educational
project targeting these key individuals is essential, and should be a
part of a remedy. Successful education would support the notion that
'259
nonprofit organizations do indeed deserve their "halo effect.
Third, appropriate public reporting strategies must be in place.
To be effective, compliance is required. Any workable reporting
strategy will need to balance compliance costs and effectiveness. U.S.
and Australia's compliance systems are largely self-assessment
regimes that depend on key personnel within the nonprofit sector and
their professional advisors. Thus, tied to the disclosure and reporting
strategies that will be part of an effective regulatory regime, needs to
be a moral climate of cooperation, openness, and honesty.
Fourth, there must be tight accountability standards applied to
private foundations-and other nonprofit'organizations. They must
embrace the highest ethical standards and strict financial standards,
as the funds they collect, invest, and ultimately distribute are
intended for the benefit of the public.
Finally, a single regulator with the core business mission of
nonprofit accountability is needed. This regulator should be an
independent, unbiased, and strong federal oversight agency not
beholden to politicians and powerful citizens and should be created
for the specific purposes of advising and monitoring private
foundations, other nonprofit organizations, and their decisionmakers. 260 The suggested new regulatory agency might incorporate
some of the positive strategies and objectives of the Charity
Commission for England and Wales. That Commission has three

259.
260.

See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
See Joel Fleishman, Public Trust in Not-For-Profit Organizations and the

Need for Regulatory Reform, in PHILANTHROPY AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN A

CHANGING AMERICA 172 (Charles T. Clotfelter & Thomas Erlich eds., 1999)
(envisioning three possible monitoring strategies, amongst which is a new federal
regulatory commission). Crimm, supra note 90 (envisioning a single regulator with
these attributes modeled after the Charity Commission for England and Wales).
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main strategic goals: (1) to ensure that charities can operate for their
exempt purposes within an effective legal, accounting, and
governance framework; (2) to improve charities' governance,
accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness; and (3) to identify and
address abuse and poor practices. 2 6 ' To accomplish these objectives,
the Commission is responsible for determining whether an
organization qualifies for charitable status, has oversight authority
over the registration of charities, is available on request to provide
2 62
is
information and legal advice to charities and their trustees,
responsible for supervising the nonprofit sector to ensure compliance
with laws and to provide advice to "prevent trouble or put the charity
back on a proper footing,"263 and is charged with investigating alleged
wrongdoing. 264 Thus, the Commission's aim is to instill public
confidence in the integrity of charities, 265 which supports the
important "halo effect" essential to a viable and vibrant nonprofit
sector.

V.

CONCLUSION

The history and comments in Part II are intended as cautionary
notes, of which concerned Australians should be aware as the
development of the nonprofit sector and the growth of prescribed
private funds evolve. The insights in Part III that evolve from U.S.
experiences are intended to provide insights to persons in key
positions of responsibility in Australia's nonprofit sector, in the
agencies responsible for regulating that sector, and in the legislative
It is hoped that, through this Article's
branch of government.
identification of those shortcomings of the U.S. federal tax regulatory
regime that unintentionally permit improprieties and abuses even
after ninety years of reformation, Australia may be able to avoid some
of the pitfalls as the design and innovation of its tax regulatory
scheme progresses.

CHARITY COMMISSION FOR ENGLAND AND WALES, ANNUAL REPORT 2000-2001, at
261.
16 (2001), availableat http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk./tcc/pdfslannualreportOOOl.pdf
Where all relevant information has been provided to the Charity
262.
Commission for England and Wales, and trustees follow the Commission's advice, the
trustees are legally protected. CHARITY COMMISSION FOR ENGLAND AND WALES,
CHARITIES

AND

THE

CHARITY

COMMISSION,

available at

http://www.charity-

commission.gov. ukpublications/cc2.asp#5, (2000) [hereinafter CCC].
Id.
263.
264.

CHARITY COMMISSION FOR ENGLAND AND WALES, ABOUT THE CHARITY

COMMISSION, available at http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/tcc/ccabout.htm (last
visited Oct. 18, 2001).
The Charity Commission is accountable for its decisions to the courts and
265.
for its efficiency to the Home Secretary. CCC, supra note 262, at 2.

€€ .k €

